Real Exchange Rates and Foreign Portfolio Investment by Bloom, Patrick Roll
UC San Diego
UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Real Exchange Rates and Foreign Portfolio Investment
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8c11f29h
Author
Bloom, Patrick Roll
Publication Date
2019
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO
Real Exchange Rates and Foreign Portfolio Investment
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Economics
by
Patrick Bloom
Committee in charge:
Marc-Andreas Muendler, Chair
Prashant Bharadwaj
James Hamilton
Gordon Hanson
Michael Melvin
Natalia Ramondo
2019
Copyright
Patrick Bloom, 2019
All rights reserved.
The dissertation of Patrick Bloom is approved, and it is
acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm
and electronically:
Chair
University of California San Diego
2019
iii
EPIGRAPH
The only moment of happiness possible, that’s the present.
The past gives regrets. And the future uncertainty.
Man understood this very quickly and invented religion. It forgives him for the evil he’s done in
the past and tells him not to worry about the future—because he’ll go to Paradise.
That means, take advantage of the present.
—Arsene Wenger
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Real Exchange Rates and Foreign Portfolio Investment
by
Patrick Bloom
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California San Diego, 2019
Marc-Andreas Muendler, Chair
Chapter 1 uses real interest rates to show that the long-term real exchange rate and a
risk premium are more volatile than the nominal exchange rate for four developing countries.
Chapter 2 finds country-level effects of foreign portfolio investment in 18 developing countries
and proposes a channel for real exchange rate volatility driven by foreign portfolio investment.
Chapter 3 shows that there are plant-level productivity gains in Chile from small levels and small
increases in foreign ownership typical of portfolio investment.
Nominal exchange rate changes can be decomposed into inflation differentials and real
components, each having different causes and consequences. Although we have explanations for
each component, the relative importance of the long-run real exchange rate has previously not
xiii
been quantified. Chapter 1 uses inflation-linked bond data for Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey to quantify the contribution of those components to exchange rate changes against the
United States. We find that the long-term expected real exchange rate plus its risk premium is
even more volatile than the nominal exchange rate.
Volatility and unforecastability of real exchange rates is a fundamental puzzle of inter-
national economics, and these features are even more pronounced in developing countries. In
chapter 2, we present a new fact, that inward portfolio investment in equities predicts the extensive
margin of imports in 18 developing countries. With this we build a purely real model in which
foreign investors finance new intermediate inputs and increase productivity in the tradeable goods
sector. We express the Balassa-Samuelson determined real exchange rate as a function of foreign
investment. We use the established fact that investors in developed countries exhibit positive
feedback or operate under portfolio constraints and show how therefore the real exchange rate
reacts positively to equity prices. We test and confirm the prediction of the model that equity
portfolio investment predicts exchange rates at quarterly frequencies. We also confirm that the
extensive margin of imports comoves with the real exchange rate at annual frequencies, and do
not reject that equity portfolio investment acts through this channel only.
In chapter 3, we measure the effect of foreign ownership on the productivity of Chilean
manufacturers between 1998 and 2001. Total factor productivity is measured at the plant level
using multiple alternative methods. Both the level of foreign ownership and increases in foreign
ownership are significant predictors of productivity. These effects remain when restricting the
sample to plants with low foreign ownership and small changes in foreign ownership, showing the
importance of foreign portfolio investment on productivity. A non-parametric fit suggests that low
levels of foreign ownership are as significant as larger stakes. When controlling for endogeneity
in the foreign investment decision by instrumenting with total developed countries’ portfolio
outflows the positive effects on productivity remain. Finally we show that foreign ownership
predicts that firms source more of their intermediate inputs from abroad.
xiv
Chapter 1
Nominal vs long-term real exchange rate
volatility
1.1 Introduction
The exchange rate between two currencies determines the relative price of domestic goods
and assets between the two countries. Exchange rate changes are therefore a combination of
differentially changing domestic price levels and a changing relative price level. This paper
quantifies the importance of the first, nominal, contribution, and the second, real, contribution.
Standard expositions of exchange rate determination rely primarily on differential inflation,
uncovered interest parity, and purchasing power parity. By design those approaches ignore the
violation of purchasing power parity, even though it is known to be large and persistent (Rogoff
1996.) The real exchange rate for traded goods may even be as volatile as for non-traded goods
(Engel 1999). 1
1Engel (1999) demonstrated this for the US exchange rate versus several developed countries using five different
metrics for traded goods prices. Further work documenting this fact across many currency pairs by Betts and Kehoe
(2008) used sectoral gross output deflators or producer price indices for traded goods prices, whereas Burstein,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2006) used a weighted average of import and export price indices for developed countries.
Yepez and Dzikpe (2019) extend Engel’s methods to developing countries with similar results.
1
The standard exchange rate model in small, open economy macroeconomics (illustrated
in e.g. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2002) is that monetary shocks interact with sticky prices.
In this model, a positive monetary shock with fixed prices increases output and depreciates the
currency, and then as prices adjust the real exchange rate returns to its previous level under
presumed relative purchasing parity. This mean-reversion implies that the long-term expected real
exchange rate would be much less volatile than the current nominal exchange rate. We provide
evidence against this theory.
Earlier empirical work by Mussa (1986) founds that real exchange rates were less volatile
under fixed nominal regimes than under floating nominal exchange rate regimes. He concluded
that sticky prices were the dominant mechanism. However, we find that these inflation-linked
bond markets do not agree that real exchange rate volatility is transient and mean-reverting as
sticky prices adjust.
Real exchange rate changes between advanced economies are humped-shaped in that they
are initially persistent and then mean reverting. Burstein and Gopinath (2014) document that the
half-lifes of those real exchange rate changes are between 1.5 and 6 years. This would imply
that current real exchange rate changes would not greatly influence very long-term expectations
because current changes largely die out over time.
Clarida (2012) studies daily currency fluctuations between the dollar and the pound, euro,
and yen. He assumes a constant long-term expected real exchange rate, and attributes all variation
to the risk premia. This amounts to assuming that future relative purchasing power parity holds
over the sample.2 This paper instead examines countries where neither absolute nor relative PPP
is expected versus the US. This is a richer problem in exchange rate economics.
The contribution of this paper is to solve for the expected long-term real exchange plus its
risk premium as a function of observables, assuming only no-arbitrage, and then to quantify this
component with market data. We find that the long-term expected real exchange rate plus its risk
2We will return to this alternative framework and compare our decomposition to Clarida’s at the end of section 2.
2
premium is even more volatile than the nominal exchange rate.
The rest if this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the financial math relating
exchange rates, price levels, real yields, and expectations. Section 3 discusses how we will apply
this framework. Section 4 describes the sources for data. Section 5 covers possible complications
or problems. Sections 6 reports the results. And section 7 concludes.
1.2 Definitions and foundations
1.2.1 Pricing measure and domestic bonds
Any asset with uncertain payoff xT can be priced as
xt = Et
[
1
It
mT xT
]
=
1
It
Et [mT xT ] , (1.1)
where It is the gross nominal interest rate between periods t and T , and mT is the pricing kernel
or stochastic discount factor (following e.g. Harrison and Kreps 1979). The existence of this mT
follows only from no-arbitrage and its uniqueness from market completeness, or that all of these
assets are tradeable. In this paper, we will be careful to sub-script all variables such that zs is
Fs-measurable, where Es indicates an expectation conditional with respect to Fs . Et [mT ] = 1 and
mT is non-negative almost everywhere, so we can define mT = dQdP as a Radon-Nikodyn derivative
and rewrite the pricing formula as
xt = EQt
[
1
It
xT
]
=
1
It
EQt [xT ] . (1.2)
Actual expectations are formed under the physical probability measure P whereas the risk-neutral
measure Q prices assets.
The application to pricing domestic bonds is that, with a price of 1, they have a certain
3
payoff It .
1.2.2 Foreign bonds
The nominal exchange rate Et is expressed in units of domestic currency per foreign
currency. Therefore an increase in Et represents an appreciation of the foreign currency.
Applying the pricing formula to one foreign bond from the perspective of a domestic
investor we get
Et = EQt
[
1
It
I∗t ET
]
=
I∗t
It
EQt [ET ] (1.3)
where I∗t is the gross nominal interest rate on foreign bonds between t and T . This relation is
what we know as “Uncovered Interest Parity.”
1.2.3 Inflation-linked bonds
An inflation-linked bond pays a certain real return Rt multiplied by the increase in the
price level ΠT , where ΠT = PT/Pt . 3
Therefore the pricing formula applied to a domestic inflation-linked bond is
1 = EQt
[
1
It
RtΠT
]
=
Rt
It
EQt [ΠT ] .
So
EQt [ΠT ] =
It
Rt
. (1.4)
1.2.4 Foreign inflation-linked bonds
A foreign inflation-linked bond pays a certain real return R∗t multiplied by the increase in
the price level Π∗T , where Π∗T = P
∗
T/P∗t .
3To be clear, (nominal) bonds pay a certain nominal return, which is risky in real terms. Inflation-linked bonds
pay a certain real return, which is risky in nominal terms.
4
The pricing formula gives us
Et = EQt
[
1
It
R∗t Π
∗
T ET
]
=
R∗t
It
EQt [Π∗T ET ] . (1.5)
1.2.5 Real exchange rate
The real exchange rate Qt for the foreign consumption basket with respect to the domestic
is
Qt = Et
P∗t
Pt
. (1.6)
So real exchange rate growth follows as
QT
Qt
=
ET
Et
Π∗T
ΠT
. (1.7)
1.2.6 Key identity
Rearranging (1.7) and taking expectations we get
EtEQt [QTΠT ] = QtE
Q
t [ETΠ∗T ] .
The expectation on the right-hand side appeared earlier in pricing the foreign inflation-linked
bond (1.5), so we can replace it and state
EQt [QTΠT ] = Qt
It
R∗t
.
Now we use the pricing formula for the domestic inflation-linked bond (1.4) to substitute for It
and state Qt as a function of real returns and expectations:
Qt =
R∗t
Rt
EQt [QTΠT ]
EQt [ΠT ]
.
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Plugging this expression for the real exchange rate into the definition of the real exchange rate
(1.6) we can solve for the nominal exchange rate:
Et =
Pt
P∗t
R∗t
Rt
EQt
[
QT
ΠT
EQt ΠT
]
. (1.8)
This is a sort of “Real Uncovered Interest Parity” relation.
We are interested in the true expected long-term real exchange rate, which we will call
QEt = EPt [QT ]. The expectation (1.8) can be rewritten as
Et =
Pt
P∗t
R∗t
Rt
QEt Θt , (1.9)
which defines Θt , a risk-premium term.4. It is important to note, that even a risk-neutral investor,
where the risk-neutral probability measure Q is almost everywhere equal to the physical measure
P, could have Θ 6= 1 because of the possible covariance between the real exchange rate and the
domestic inflation rate. On the other hand, in our application we are interested in the covariance
between US inflation and, for example, the real exchange rate with Turkey. We expect this to be
zero.
Taking logs of both sides, and denoting logs of uppercase variables by their lowercase,
et = pt− p∗t + r∗t − rt +qEt +θt . (1.10)
Finally taking differences in time we have
∆et = pit−pi∗t +∆r∗t −∆rt +∆qEt +∆θt , (1.11)
where ∆ is the difference between t−1 and t in a monthly series.
It is worth stressing that this decomposition has relied only upon the assumption of no-
4Specifically, Θt = 1+ 1QEt Cov
P
(
QT,
dQ
dPΠT
EPt
[
dQ
dPΠT
]
)
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arbitrage. Nor have we required any assumptions about the form of the pricing measure. This
is in contrast to Clarida (2012) who assumes that the pricing measure is homogeneous in the
domestic price level.
1.2.7 Comparison to the literature
Clarida (2012) presents results for developed countries’ exchange rates by plotting et
versus pt − p∗t + r∗t − rt . He calls the latter the “risk-neutral fair value.” Following from 1.10
the difference is qEt +θt . Arguably, for similar, large, and economically-integrated developed
countries it may be reasonable to assume that qEt is constant and that θt is significant and volatile.
However, for smaller, poorer, countries that are distant to US investors, θt should be close to zero,
and qEt explains the difference.
Imakubo, Kamada, and Kan extend the Clarida framework assuming investors expectations
of the real exchange rate is formed as the HP-filter of historical observations. We take the opposite
approach and require fewer assumptions.
1.3 Empirical strategy
In this paper, we use the US Dollar as the domestic currency and examine, as foreign
currencies, the Mexican Peso, Brazilian Real, South African Rand, and Turkish Lira.5
The notation above used t and T for the two time periods. We will call these today, and
the long-term. The long-term will be 10-20 years depending on the data. Given that the real rate
yield curve is typically flat between 10 and 20 years maturities the differences are arguably of
minor economic importance.6
5This sample of countries is not random; these are the only developing countries that issue inflation-linked bonds.
This reflects some financial competence on the part of the debt management agency in these countries. On the other
hand, they may be issuing inflation-linked bonds because investors are wary of high inflation in that currency. We
acknowledge these competing selection effects may be present.
6Specifically, for the sample April 2008 to July 2017 the Mexican zero-coupon real yield curve slope between
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The changes denoted by ∆ will be interpreted to be monthly, reflecting the frequency
of CPI measurement by national statistical agencies. Accordingly we will perform a variance
decomposition of monthly exchange rate changes.
Exchange rates, inflation rates, and real yields from inflation-linked bonds are all easily
observable. These will allow us to jointly construct a monthly series for the sum ∆qEt +∆θt .
Disentangling those two components would require some stricter assumptions, which we forego
in the interest of generality.7
There is a strong argument that Θt is close to 1, so that θt is near zero. This would follow
if the long-term real exchange rate QT is independent of both the stochastic discount factor and
the domestic inflation rate. The first condition holds if US investors’ marginal utilities vary
independently of, for example, the prospects of South African mining operations. The second
condition holds if over the long term, US inflation varies little with the real economy of Brazil.
Consequently, it is economically difficult to justify a large θt . To prove θt = 0 follows from
independence, return to (1.8) and apply the law of iterated expectations to
EPt
[
QT
mTΠT
EPt (mTΠT )
]
= Et
[
Et
[
QT mTΠTEt(mTΠT ) | mT,ΠT
]]
(1.12)
= Et
[
QTEt
[
mTΠT
Et(mTΠT )
| mT,ΠT
]]
= Et [QT ]
Once we have time series for pit−pi∗t +∆r∗t −∆rt and for ∆qEt +∆θt , we can use (1.11) to
decompose the variance of ∆et as
Var(∆et) =Var(pit−pi∗t +∆r∗t −∆rt)+Var(∆qEt +∆θt)+2Cov(pit−pi∗t +∆r∗t −∆rt ,∆qEt +∆θt).
(1.13)
A similar decomposition applies to the nominal exchange rate as a level et , following from (1.10).
10 and 20 years averaged 70 basis points with a standard deviation of 37 bps. Furthermore, all results at 20 year
maturity are reproduced at 10 years maturity as a robustness check in appendix A.1.
7One approach could be to parametrize the pricing kernel. In appendix A.2 we outline a general approach for
estimating pricing kernels from observable data and prices.
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A second decomposition uses the identity
Var(∆et) =Cov(∆et ,Πt−Π∗t +∆r∗t −∆rt)+Cov(∆et ,∆qEt +∆θt) (1.14)
and similarly in changes. When we divide through by Var(∆et) (in our case we normalize it), the
terms on the right hand side are like regression coefficients that must sum to 1. In this case they
can be interpreted as how well ∆et explains its constituents.
1.4 Data
Long-term real yield data for the US is collected by the Federal Reserve, cleaned with the
method of Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010), and available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/default.htm.
Real yield data for Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey is available from Bloomberg
Finance L.P. We use month end yields and spline a real-yield par curve at each date. This par
curve represents the yields of coupon-paying bonds. Splining a curve is standard practice to
smooth over any bond-specific idiosyncrasies. We then convert the resulting par curve to a zero
curve, from which we can select a fixed maturity. Figure 1.1 shows the results of this approach
for Mexican inflation-linked bonds on November 30, 2012 (the midpoint of the sample).
Exchange rates are from the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s FRED database, as is US CPI.
The Brazilian CPI (called IPCA) is from the website of the Brazilian statistical agency
(IBGE.) The Mexican CPI (INPC) is from Banco de Mexico. The South African CPI is from
Statistics South Africa. The Turkish CPI is from the Turkish Statistical Institute. All of these
consumer price indices are reported and analyzed as monthly series.
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Figure 1.1: Mexican inflation-linked bond yields and smoothed par and zero real yield curves
on November 30, 2012. Source: Bloomberg Finance LP and author’s calculations.
1.5 Discussion of measurement
1.5.1 CPI timing
CPI for a month is measured throughout that month and then published sometime in the
following month. In this paper we assume that the CPI is known by market participants at the end
of the measurement month and the exchange rate is priced accordingly.
1.5.2 Inflation-linked bond timing
For settlement purposes, inflation-linked bonds trade with respect to a reference CPI,
which is the CPI 3 months earlier, and interpolated between months. This means that the relevant
price levels in the inflation-linked bond pricing-formula are actually mis-timed by 3 months. We
can add a correction for this. We haven’t done that, but it is tiny, because 3 months of inflation is
small versus the future inflation over the 20 year life of the bond. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright
(2010) ignore this when reporting expected future inflation on the Federal Reserve website. If the
inflation observed since the reference CPI is the same as it is expected to be in the future, then
10
this correction would be zero.8
1.5.3 Illiquidity
One possible objection to this approach is that these markets for inflation-linked bonds are
relatively illiquid. However, we expect there exists a marginal investor willing to buy cheap assets.
So the illiquidity objection is a rejection of the weak form of the efficient markets hypothesis.
More generally, we can only ask what the market expects based on observable prices. Those
expectations may be wrong ex-post or strange ex-ante.
Figure 1.2 plots the 10 year “breakeven inflation” computed as the difference between
the nominal and real yields on Mexican nominal and inflation-linked government bonds versus
the mean 1 year inflation expectations from Banco de Mexico’s business conditions survey. The
co-movement is evidence that the inflation-linked bond market tracks reported expectations. If
anything, the correlation is higher than we might expect, suggesting that current inflation is
assumed to last long into the future.
One possible manifestation of illiquidity could be prices that update infrequently because
the bonds are not being traded on a given day. We would expect this problem to be more prevalent
for 20 year maturities than for 10 year, and also to be more significant earlier in the time series
because of the financial crisis of 2008. Appendix A.1 shows results for the 10 year maturities
that are substantively similar to those for the 20 year maturities. Furthermore, figures 1.5 and 1.6
show similar behavior for the long-term real exchange rate plus risk premium in 2008-2009 and
in 2012-2016. Consequently, we conclude that the results are not driven by stale prices on illiquid
bonds.
8Specifically, this correction would be to the real yield, and the magnitude is the difference between expected
inflation and that realized over the preceding 3 months multiplied by 3mths and divided by the maturity in months.
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Figure 1.2: 20 year ”breakeven inflation” expectations for Mexico versus 1 yr inflation
expectations reported by the Banco de Mexico. Data from Bloomberg, FRED, national statistical
agencies, and author’s calculations.
1.5.4 Default Risk
If there were a serious possibility of default on these bonds then the yields would carry
some premium. No country has defaulted on bonds issued in a currency they can print since
Russia in 1998, which was a special case (the local currency debt was largely held by foreign
investors, including Long Term Capital Management). The US has occasionally threatened to
default in the last few years but in those episodes US bonds have actually gone up in price.
The credit default swap (CDS) market shows a probability of default for these countries,
but this is somewhat technical. The CDS reflects the probability of a credit event and a recovery
rate on the lowest valued deliverable security. Say for example, if Turkey defaults on a euro-
denominated bond for political reasons and continues payments on its local-currency bonds. Then
the buyer of protection uses the CDS to deliver the defaulted euro-denominated bond to the seller
of protection. The local-currency bonds would be unaffected. Therefore the CDS market hugely
overstates the probabilities of credit events in local-currency markets.
Stockman (1988) suggests that capital controls would be more likely imposed in a time of
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high inflation. This would lead the market to under-price inflation because full repayment is less
likely in that scenario. Therefore the market-implied expected long-term real exchange rate would
be lower than the true (physical measure) expectation. We admit that these “peso problems”, or
unobservable risks, are possible but doubt that they are significant factors in pricing. Either way
they would affect the θt term and not the results we present.
The key results of this paper concern the volatility and not the level of the long-term real
exchange rate. If default or capital controls are more likely under high inflation, then that would
slow the market from pricing high inflation. This would reduce the volatility of the long-term
real exchange rate. So if these concerns are salient, our results are conservative estimates of the
volatility of the long-term real exchange rate, which we will find to be dominant.
1.5.5 Inflation-floor protection
Most inflation-linked bonds have a built-in floor. This means that investors are protected
in case of deflation over the life of the bond. 20 years of deflation in the developing countries we
study has not happened in recent history and we assume the risk of this in the future is assessed
as low by market participants. In the US, the value depends on when exactly the bond was issued.
Over the long term this risk must be small. Therefore we use 20 year real yields for the US
without worrying about adjusting for the possibility of 20 years of deflation.
1.6 Results
Figure 1.3 plots the log of the gross 20 year real yields for Mexico and the US, which are
r and r∗ in equation 1.10. Figure 1.4 plots the evolution of the price levels, or CPI, in Mexico and
the US. Figure 1.5 plots the result of the decomposition, following equation 1.10, of the nominal
exchange and the expected long-term real exchange rate plus its risk premium. Of note is that the
latter is more volatile than the former. Furthermore, the market always expects a real depreciation
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Figure 1.3: Real yields with 20 year maturity for Mexio and USA. Sample is April 2008 to July
2017. Data from Bloomberg, FRED, national statistical agencies, and author’s calculations.
over the next 20 years.
Figure 1.4: Consumer price indices for the US and Mexico, rebased so the price level starts at 1.
Sample is April 2008 to July 2017. Data from FRED and national statistical agencies.
Table 1.1 reports the variance decomposition in levels and monthly changes for Mexico,
Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey. The variance of the nominal exchange rate for each country has
been normalized to 100 for both levels and changes. The long-term is defined as 20 years for the
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Figure 1.5: Exchange rates between Mexico and the United States, rebased so the nominal
exchange rate starts at 1. Sample is April 2008 to July 2017. Data from Bloomberg, FRED,
national statistical agencies, and author’s calculations.
Table 1.1: Variance decomposition of nominal exchange rate for Mexico, Brazil, South Africa,
and Turkey exchange rates versus the US. The long term is 20 years forward, except for Turkey
where it is 10 years forward. Sample is April 2008 to July 2017 for Mexico, November 2005 to
July 2017 for Brazil, September 2011 to July 2017 for South Africa, and April 2010 to July 2017
for Turkey, in all cases the sample start is determined by data availability. Data are normalized
such that var(et) = 100 for each row. Data from Bloomberg, FRED, national statistical agencies,
and author’s calculations.
var(qEt +θt) var(pt− p∗t − rt + r∗t ) cov(qEt +θt , pt− p∗t − rt + r∗t )
Mexico
levels 137 21 -29
changes 496 362 -379
Brazil
levels 117 47 -32
changes 356 189 -222
South Africa
levels 28 36 18
changes 208 92 -100
Turkey
levels 31 40 14
changes 256 189 -172
first three countries and as 10 years for Turkey.
For all four countries, the long-term real exchange rate plus its risk premium is more
volatile than the nominal exchange rate, where volatility is defined as the variance of the changes.
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For Mexico and Brazil, qEt +θt varies more than the nominal exchange rate, et , in levels. For
South Africa and Turkey on the other hand, qEt + θt varies less than et in levels, suggesting
mean-reversion in the changes of the former.
Table 1.2 reports the covariance decomposition, where the two columns of course sum to
the normalized variance 100. The same key facts are apparent: that the real exchange rate plus
the risk premium is the dominant contributor to variance of changes (volatility) in all countries,
and that South African and Turkey are qualitatively different in levels.
Table 1.2: Covariance decomposition of nominal exchange rate for Mexico, Brazil, South
Africa, and Turkey exchange rates versus the US. The long term is 20 years forward, except for
Turkey where it is 10 years forward. Sample is April 2008 to July 2017 for Mexico, November
2005 to July 2017 for Brazil, September 2011 to July 2017 for South Africa, and April 2010
to July 2017 for Turkey, in all cases the sample start is determined by data availability. Data
are normalized such that var(et) = 100 for each row. Data from Bloomberg, FRED, national
statistical agencies, and author’s calculations.
cov(et ,qEt +θt) cov(et , pt− p∗t − rt + r∗t )
Mexico
levels 108 -8
changes 117 -17
Brazil
levels 85 15
changes 134 -34
South Africa
levels 46 54
changes 108 -8
Turkey
levels 45 55
changes 83 17
Figure 1.6 plots the time series of the decomposition for Brazil. It is interesting to note
that, for example, the depreciation of the Brazilian Real in 2015 was driven by the long-term real
exchange rate. Relative to the US dollar, the currency is always (over our whole sample) expected
to depreciate in real terms over the next 20 years.
16
Figure 1.6: Exchange rates between Brazil and the United States, rebased so the nominal
exchange rate starts at 1. Sample is November 2005 to July 2017. Data from Bloomberg, FRED,
national statistical agencies, and author’s calculations.
1.7 Conclusion
Real exchange rate volatility may be the fundamental puzzle of international macro-
economics (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2002.) Real exchange rates are the long-term,
conceptual determinants of exchange rates outside of hyper-inflationary episodes. For the
exchange rates between the United States and Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey, the
long-term real exchange rate and risk premium contribute more than double the variance to
monthly changes in nominal exchange rates.
This evidence reinforces to the “exchange rate determination puzzle” in which exchange
rates vary considerably more than fundamentals, and which may be explained by, for example,
heterogeneity of beliefs (Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2006.) This evidence is inconsistent with
the standard open economy macroeconomics explanation of sticky prices and monetary shocks.
After a monetary shock, these models predict prices will adjust slowly so that the real exchange
will mean revert to a level determined by fundamentals.
For monthly or shorter changes in the exchange rate market, it is not only that the expected
17
long-term real rate is significant. It is, more nearly, that the expected long-term real exchange rate
is the only thing that matters.
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Chapter 2
An equity portfolio investment channel for
real exchange rate volatility
2.1 Introduction
Exchange rates are volatile and move more than forecast by standard existing models (the
sixth puzzle of Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000.)1 Accounting for inflation differentials it is variation
in the real exchange rate, or the ratio of price levels between countries, that is particularly difficult
to explain. In other words, relative price levels are neither stable nor mean-reverting.
In figure 2.1, we plot real exchange rates for six developing countries and the United
States over a five year period (taken from the BIS and normalized to show only changes.) Table
2.1 shows the standard deviation of monthly real exchange rate changes for each country. Ignoring
trends, developing countries’ real exchange rates are more volatile than for the US, by roughly
a factor of two. So the fundamental puzzle of real exchange rates is even more pronounced in
these countries. A key distinction is that developing countries have lower productivity and price
1“The central puzzle in international business cycles is that fluctuations in real exchange rates are volatile and
persistent.” So state Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2002 in the first sentence of their abstract and then again in the
first sentence of their paper.
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Figure 2.1: Broad Real Effective Exchange Rates, May 2013 - April 2018. Rebased to 100 at
May 2013. Source: Bank for International Settlements
levels, and therefore can either catch up or fall back in relative terms to the US. The US on the
other hand is near the technological frontier and makes productive advances through an entirely
different mechanism.
Developing countries interact commercially with developed countries with trade in
goods and with financial investment flows, both of which may facilitate changes in productivity.
Financial flows dominate the discussion of economic outcomes in developing countries in the
Table 2.1: Mean and standard deviation of monthly changes in Broad Real Effective Exchange
Rates, May 2013 - April 2018. Data from Bank for International Settlements and author’s
calculations.
(1) (2)
mean std dev
United States 0.24% 1.09%
India 0.11% 1.53%
Indonesia -0.15% 1.97%
Mexico -0.36% 2.25%
Turkey -0.54% 2.41%
South Africa 0.05% 2.99%
Brazil -0.20% 3.33%
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popular and financial press. However in most international economic models prices adjust without
any transactions taking place. Given the scale of financial flows and documented effects at the
firm level, it is natural to investigate their importance at the country level.2 We fill this gap
by providing a real model that incorporates foreign investment, new trade, and exchange rate
determination.
We use import customs data from the UN Comtrade database, classified by the Harmonized
System at the 6-digit level, and international investment flow data from the IMF’s Balance of
Payments Database for the years 2000-2016. We document that equity portfolio investment
predicts the extensive margin of imports in developing countries. We furthermore control for
endogeneity of the equity portfolio investment, by instrumenting for recipient inflows with equity
portfolio outflows from large developed countries, weighted by trade shares to the recipient
countries, and find similar results. We use the classification of imports into Broad Economic
Categories provided by the UN and find that more than 90% of the new imports predicted were
intermediate or capital goods.
Then we look at older episodes of equity market liberalizations and import data classified
by the SITC system at the 5-digit level. We test for a structural break in the growth rate of the
extensive margin of imports and find that it increased (formally, we reject the null hypothesis
that it stayed the same.) This new fact, that equity portfolio investment finances new imports at
the country level forms the foundation of the model. In an appendix we also tests and confirm
the already established fact that equity portfolio investment is procyclical with respect to equity
returns in these countries. We use this to motivate the inclusion of a portfolio or leverage constraint
in the model.
This paper presents a purely real model of the exchange rate in which foreign investment
finances imports of new intermediate goods. These intermediate goods are used to make tradeable
goods more productively. We don’t require transport costs and therefore tradeable goods have
2Section 2.1 summarizes literature on portfolio investment in equities in developing countries.
21
one price globally. The real exchange rate is determined by the relative price of nontradeable
goods, as in the Balassa-Samuelson effect (both 1964). Furthermore the real exchange rate moves
with relative national incomes, known as the Penn effect. We choose to model this way in order
to capture the economically beneficial effects of foreign investment.
In order to richen the dynamics we assume that foreign investors face a leverage constraint.
To build an information channel into the model we assume there is an information signalling
mechansim about future productivity in order to generate equity price volatility. The leverage
constraint for foreign investors causes feedback from equity prices into investment, productivity,
and thus the equilibrium exchange rate. The endogenous amplification of volatility explains why
real exchange rates move as much as they do.
The first key test we perform is a regression of nominal exchange rates on portfolio equity
investment at the quarterly frequency, where we find predictability. The second test is a regression
of the real exchange rate on new varieties of imports, where we find comovement, and on lagged
portfolio equity investment, where we do not reject that it is insignificant other than via new
imports. We then parametrize the model and ask how important this channel is for transmiting
equity price volatility to exchange rate volatility and for the effect of a rise in the world real
interest rate on real exchange rates.
The contributions of this paper are to 1) document the real effects of portfolio equity
investment on new imports, 2) solve a real model in which foreign investment appears explicitly
in the closed form solution for the real exchange rate, and 3) illustrate the connection between
equity prices and real exchange rates. This solves the puzzle that developing countries exchange
rates react to the world real interest rate, and not just to interest rate differentials, as predicted by
uncovered interest parity. 3
The model is entirely real, so is distinct from mechanisms in which the central bank is
at fault for all crises. Furthermore, although bad loans or other problems in the banking system
3Developing countries’ currencies’ generalized depreciations between 2013 and 2017 are largely attributed to
rising US interest rates even though most EM rates rose even more.
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can obviously cause a crisis, the mechanism in this paper operates independently of anything
happening in a domestic banking system. The model ascribes real effects to portfolio flows, and
offers a closed form expression for the real exchange rate. Several empirical facts corroborate the
model’s mechanisms and implications.
This paper contains elements from international trade, macroeconomics, and finance, and
consequently builds upon several distinct literatures.
A long-studied question has been the relationship between trade and growth and the
direction of causation. Frankel and Romer (1999) suggest that trade itself causes growth at
the macro level. Both Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) modeled growth
as the creation of new intermediate inputs, which we use to make the connection between
portfolio investment and productivity via new intermediates. Feenstra and Kee (2008) examine
the relationship between export variety and country productivity, whereas we flip this and think
about imported input variety determining productivity.
Leverage constraints are understood as a source of amplification and contagion of falling
asset prices by Pavlova and Rigobon (2008), however changing the market price of an endowment
stream is a relatively small and uninteresting effect compared to understanding the large real
fluctuations in those countries. We show how leverage constraints connect prices to financial
flows to real outcomes.
A large literature focuses on crisis episodes in developing countries and seeks to explain
the prevalence of those episodes. The first point is that borrowing in a foreign currency makes
depreciations worse for the borrower, and being forced to borrow in foreign currency is typically
called the “original sin” of developing countries. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) suggest that
foreign currency borrowing creates financial fragility and can be avoided by developing deeper
domestic credit markets to allow local currency borrowing. Tirole (2003), however, argues that
foreign currency borrowing is optimal because it commits the country to avoid depreciation at the
expense of creditors. We do not consider debt at all and target a completely distinct mechanism.
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The existing literature on third-generation currency crises that arose after the Asian crisis
of 1998 typically has domestic firms borrowing in foreign currency to finance production (e.g.
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee 2001 or Corsetti and Pesenti 2001.) A shock to production, the
interest rate, or the exchange rate can then lead to default or depreciation via a drop in domestic
money demand. However, in these cases, optimal monetary policy can prevent the devaluation
and the default. This is the international crisis equivalent of Friedman and Schwartz’s conclusion
that the Great Depression was, as Ben Bernanke put it, essentially the central bank’s fault.4 This
paper argues that any less-developed country open to capital flows may experience real exchange
rate volatility independent of monetary policy.
The standard explanation in small, open economy macroeconomics is illustrated in Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002.) Monetary shocks and sticky prices interact so that when the money
supply increases the real exchange rate depreciates and output increases. This is the opposite
correlation from our model and the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Furthermore, Blanco and Cravino
(2018) find at the micro level that prices which are updated in each period do not violate relative
purchasing power parity any less. In Chapter 1 we showed that the market expectation of the
long term real exchange rate and its risk premium is as volatile or more volatile than the nominal
exchange rate. Consequently, neither price setters nor financial markets behave as if it is sticky
prices that cause the real exchange rate movement.
In distinct mechanisms, many important papers generate exchange rate movements with
a selected shock or shocks. Mendoza (2010) generates a leverage cycle, including busts, with
correlated shocks for total factor productivity, the world interest rate, and the price of intermediate
inputs. An alternative explanation has been that foreign securities firms face destructive trading
costs in equities which, coupled with a domestic collateral constraint that limits debt borrowing,
make equity prices volatile and debt-deflation possible (Mendoza and Smith 2013.) Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) generate real exchange rate movement via productivity shocks to heterogeneous
4“Regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry.” Bernanke 2002
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firms that cause variety destruction.
Finally, the impossibility of controlling the exchange rate, allowing international capital
mobility, and implementing independent monetary policy is well established as the “trilemma”
(Obstfeld and Taylor 2004.) More recently, Rey (2015) argues for the existence of a ”global
financial cycle” that subsumes domestic monetary policy. Those papers primarily view capital
flows as a monetary phenomenon. This chapter documents that portfolio flows have significant
effects via real channels, and that country-specific factors remain important in the face of a global
cycle.
One interpretation of this chapter is a contribution to explain the ”global financial cycle”
as operating through a specific channel of portfolio investment in equities and new imports of
intermediates. However we are in contrast to Rey in showing that there are gains to international
capital flows in the data and we present them as our key empirical motivating fact.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 document an
empirical facts, entirely new, that portfolio equity investment predicts imports of new varieties
of goods. Section 4 briefly describes the model, and then presents the full model, resulting in
a few key equations for the important dynamics. Section 5 reports two regressions: the first is
of the quarterly exchange rate change on lags of equity price changes, portfolio flows, and the
exchange rate change, confirming that portfolio equity investment predicts the exchange rate; the
second is of the annual real exchange rate on imports of new varieties of goods in that year and
on the previous year’s foreign equity investment inflows, confirming that new varieties comove
with the real exchange rate and finding no other statistically significant effect of the preceding
years’ foreign investment inflows. In section 6 we ask what plausible magnitudes the model
explains and apply the parametrized model to explain the ”taper tantrum” and excess exchange
rate volatility. Section 7 concludes.
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2.2 Portfolio equity investment
2.2.1 Literature on real effects of portfolio investment
Many studies have found that foreign portfolio investment relaxes domestic financial
constraints and frictions. Henry (2007) summarized “(a)ll the evidence we have indicates that
countries derive substantial benefits from opening their equity markets to foreign investors.”
Claessens and Rhee (1994) found that stock markets in which it was easier to invest had higher
P/E ratios. Levine and Zervos (1998) showed that stock market liquidity and banking development
positively predict growth. Henry (2000) found that stock market liberalizations in developing
countries were followed by positive excess stock returns. This shows that foreign investors
provide additional productive capital for a lower expected return at the margin. Sensitivity
of small firms’ investment to cash flow fell 80% after financial liberalizations in a panel of
firms from 13 countries (Laeven 2002.) Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk (2004) and Bekaert,
Haney, and Lundblad (2005) found that financial liberalizations spurred growth, or in other words
that financing market failures inhibited productive investment. Forbes (2007) found that the
Chilean “encaje” tax on capital flows caused financial constraints for small firms. So access to
foreign capital did finance investment that would otherwise not happen. After equity market
liberalizations, firms in sectors more dependent on external finance increased exports more
(Manova 2008.) Taken together, these results suggest that portfolio equity investment provides
financing for productive investment that would not otherwise occur.
A separate literature supports the notion that foreign ownership improves productivity,
including in linked firms, and makes exporting more likely, including in neighboring firms.
Mexican manufacturing firms with some foreign investor were more likely to export and other
firms near them were too (Aitken, Hanson, Harrison 1997.) Small Venezuelan firms between
1976 and 1980 showed a positive correlation between foreign ownership and productivity (Aitken
and Harrison 1999.) Javorcik (2004) examined foreign ownership of Lithuanian firms and
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found “backward linkages”, or improved productivity in other sectors. Foreign ownership was
correlated with productivity, and the foreign ownership variable had a mean of 7.8% and a
standard deviation of 23%, indicating that this effect was about portfolio investment and not
direct investment. Ramondo (2009) found “foreign-owned” plants in Chile are more productive,
where “foreign-owned” is defined as 10% or more foreign share of ownership. Bloom (2019b)
examines the same plants and finds that the beneficial effects of foreign ownership occur at levels
of ownership associated with portfolio investment, and finds no evidence that direct investment
is more important. From these studies, we can expect portfolio equity investment to improve
productivity in recipient firms.
Finally there is evidence that listed firms are better managed and that free advice improves
productivity. Listed firms were better managed than private or family firms, and privatized firms
were better managed than government-owned (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010.) Free consulting on
management practices at Indian firms improved productivity by 11% (Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan,
McKenzie, and Roberts 2013.) And we know that investors impart knowledge of best-practices to
firms’ management via roadshows and earnings conference calls (Jung, Wong, and Zhang 2018 or
Call, Sharp, and Shohfi 2018.) Together this implies that portfolio equity investment can improve
productivity in recipient firms via advice and recommendations from foreign investors.
2.2.2 Traded varieties and portfolio investment
The extensive margin of imports
In this section we document a new fact, that equity portfolio flows predict imports of new
varieties of goods, or the extensive margin of international trade. We furthermore show that these
new varieties of goods are primarily intermediate inputs and capital goods.
Import data is available from UN Comtrade. We use the 1996 Harmonized System
of classification at the 6 digit level. We examine 18 developing countries in the years 2000-
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2016 (because before 2000, some imports are unclassified and reported as a residual outside of
classification.)5 These constitute the largest less-developed countries that are relatively open to
foreign portfolio investment.6
Each country reports its own customs data to UN Comtrade, however very small flows
are not recorded, and the cutoff for reporting is not consistent across countries. Therefore, we
want to count small flows and zeros similarly, to avoid inconsistencies, and consider them all
sparsely-traded. This follows Kehoe and Ruhl (2013) in their definition of the extensive margin
of trade (their paper title refers to the ”new goods margin”). Earlier work on the extensive margin
such as Hummels and Klenow (2005) or Broda and Weinstein (2006) followed Feenstra (1994)
in only considering zero recorded imports as non-traded when measuring the extensive margin.
Kehoe and Ruhl (2013) document that their method is more robust and behaves as expected
around events like trade liberalizations.
Imports are ranked by traded value in US dollars, and the first set comprising 90% of
imports by value are mainly-traded goods that sum to M(t)t in US dollars.7 The remaining
goods, sparsley-traded, sum to S(t)t . The superscript indicates when the goods are ordered, and the
subscript indicates when the imported values are summed. So we have that Importst =M
(t)
t +S
(t)
t ,
5Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, Vietnam.
6Largest means that each has GDP greater than 195bn USD in 2016, less-developed means GDP per capita less
than 16k USD in 2016 , and relatively open means that the average level of the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index
from 1990-2015 is greater than -1.2. Bangladesh and Egypt are excluded because they are missing some recent years’
import data in the UN Comtrade database.
7The definition of the extensive margin of imports as the 10% least traded goods follows Kehoe and Ruhl (2013.)
Appendix B.1 shows a robustness check by redoing Table 2.3 with a 5% threshold and finds very similar results.
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and that import growth can be decomposed as the weighted average of each group’s growth:
Importst+1
Importst
=
M(t)t+1+S
(t)
t+1
M(t)t +S
(t)
t
=
M(t)t
M(t)t +S
(t)
t
M(t)t+1
M(t)t
+
S(t)t
M(t)t +S
(t)
t
S(t)t+1
S(t)t
= 0.9×M
(t)
t+1
M(t)t
+0.1× S
(t)
t+1
S(t)t
.
OLS regression
To test the mechanism for new varieties growth, we are interested in absolute growth in the
goods below the sparsely-traded threshold, S(t)t+1−S(t)t . The dependent variable in the regression
is this divided by GDP in year t. This represents the margin of import growth to GDP attributable
to the goods in the S(t)t category:
Importst+1− Importst
GDPt
=
M(t)t+1−M(t)t
GDPt
+
S(t)t+1−S(t)t
GDPt
.
We will refer to this as both the extensive margin of imports and as new varieties of imported
goods, although strictly speaking they may already be imported in small values.
The independent variables of foreign investment inflows come from the IMF Balance
of Payments Database. They record net incurrence of liabilities for each country in each year,
classified as foreign direct or portfolio investment. We plot direct investment and portfolio
investment as fractions of GDP in figures 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.
The estimating equation is
(
S(t)t+1−S(t)t
GDPt
)
i
= αi+δt +β
(
In f lows
GDP
)
i,t
+ γControlsi,t + εi,t+1.
Regression results are shown in table 2.2. The preferred specification regresses new
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Figure 2.2: Foreign direct investment to GDP for select countries 2000-2016. The series is the
net incurrence of liabilities in equity securities from the IMF Balance of Payments Database.
Figure 2.3: Foreign portfolio investment to GDP for select countries 2000-2016. The series is
the net incurrence of liabilities in equity securities from the IMF Balance of Payments Database.
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varieties imported on lagged portfolio investment. It is remarkable that foreign direct investment
has no significant effect. Portfolio investment, however, has predictive power at the 1% signifi-
cance level. Because all specifications include country fixed effects, we do not cluster standard
errors by country, in agreement with Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and Wooldridge (2017). 8
Table 2.2: Regression of extensive margin of imports on investment inflows and lag of the
dependent variable. The final column means that an extra 1000 USD of portfolio investment
predicts 89.6 USD of extra imports of new varieties. All variables are expressed as fractions of
GDP. Data cover 2001 to 2015. Data from IMF, World Bank, and Federal Reserve. Standard
errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new varieties imported
lag portf eq invt 0.211*** 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.0956*** 0.0902*** 0.0896***
[0.0388] [0.0373] [0.0371] [0.0361] [0.0347] [0.0345]
lag direct eq invt -0.00322 0.00551 -0.0174 -0.0150
[0.0356] [0.0327] [0.0306] [0.0285]
lag new imports 0.044 -0.056
[0.061] [0.061]
country f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
year f.e. no no yes yes yes
Observations 252 266 267 252 266 267
R-squared 0.510 0.508 0.508 0.686 0.685 0.685
The Rey hypothesis for a global financial cycle finds some confirmation in the significance
of the year fixed effects. Clearly portfolio flows are synchronized across countries and imports of
new varieties are also, so the coefficient on portfolio flows is smaller when year fixed effects are
included. However, the results with year fixed effects show that within-year variation is important
too. Therefore within the global financial cycle, country differences matter.
Table 2.3 repeats the regression adding two lags of GDP growth as a control. GDP is
expressed in US dollars, so local currency appreciation appears in this control. If portfolio equity
investment is driven by news that also causes new imports in the following year, that news should
8Columns 1 and 4 suffer from dynamic panel, or Nickell (1981), bias because they include both country fixed
effects and a lag of the dependent variable.
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also increase current GDP and appreciate the local currency. Therefore, if this news channel is
significant, adding the control of dollar local GDP growth should decrease the estimated effect of
portfolio equity investment on new imports. Table 2.3 reports estimates nearly identical to table
2.2, suggesting that the news channel is not a primary causal mechanism for the new imports.
Table 2.3: Regression of extensive margin of imports on investment inflows and lag of the
dependent variable with added controls. The final column means that an extra 1000 USD
of portfolio investment predicts 88.7 USD of extra imports of new varieties. GDP growth is
year-on-year change in each country’s GDP expressed in US dollars. All other variables are
expressed as fractions of GDP. Data cover 2001 to 2015. Data from IMF, World Bank, and
Federal Reserve. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new varieties imported
lag portfolio eq invt 0.207*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.0944*** 0.0894** 0.0887**
[0.0385] [0.0371] [0.0369] [0.0362] [0.0346] [0.0345]
lag direct equity invt 0.00405 0.00349 -0.0223 -0.0192
[0.0356] [0.0326] [0.0310] [0.0287]
lag new imports -0.0354 -0.0470
[0.0697] [0.0630]
two lags gdp growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
Observations 252 266 267 252 266 267
R-squared 0.521 0.521 0.521 0.688 0.688 0.688
Instrumental variables
We cannot yet claim that the portfolio equity investment is causing the new imports in
these countries because of endogeneity. This endogeneity consists of “push” factors such as
global monetary conditions and global growth, and “pull” factors such as news of investment
opportunities in the recipient country. We can eliminate the latter by instrumenting for portfolio
equity inflows to a country with a Bartik-like (1991) instrument that interacts portfolio equity
outflows from the USA, UK, Japan, and Euro area with the recipient countries’ share of imports
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by the developed country in the year 2005 and a measure of ease of trading in the recipient stock
market.
This instrument is also in the style of the gravity model of financial flows from Portes and
Rey (2005), however here we considered both positive and negative flows, instead of estimated
sums of inflows and outflows in absolute value. Portes and Rey found that the magnitude of
inflows could be well-estimated by ln | in f lowsi,t |= β ln | out f lows j,t |+δ
[
Xi j
]
+ εi,t where Xi j
are controls, such as distance or shared language, between countries i and j. To adapt this to our
problem, with positive and negative flows, we take the exponent and fit a non-linear model by
least squares.
The estimating equation for the first-stage of the instrumental variables regression is
In f lowsi,t
GDPi,t
= αi+δt +βUSA
Out f lowsUSA,t
GDPi,t
Tradeshareγ1i,USAOpenness
γ2
i,t
+βEUR
Out f lowsEUR,t
GDPi,t
Tradeshareγ1i,EUROpenness
γ2
i,t
+βUK
Out f lowsUK,t
GDPi,t
Tradeshareγ1i,UKOpenness
γ2
i,t
+βJPN
Out f lowsJPN,t
GDPi,t
Tradeshareγ1i,JPNOpenness
γ2
i,t + controlsi,t + εt . (2.1)
The idea is to approximate what fraction of developed countries’ outflows would go to each
destination country. This should depend on how linked the two countries are by trade in physical
goods. It should also depend on the easy of trading in that market. The “openness” index used is
the IMF’s Financial Market Access index. The tradeshare is the balance of payments counterpart
to the financial account flow. Specifically it is the share of the developed country’s imports that
come from the developing country. The coefficients γ1 and γ2 are chosen jointly to minimize the
sum of squared errors in the non-linear first stage.9
This instrument is valid if the weighted shares are orthogonal to the innovations in the
9The estimated equation for the first stage of column 6, for example, of table 2.4 uses βUSA =−0.15
(0.21)
, βEUR = 0.33
(0.57)
,
βUK = 1.20
(1.48)
, βJPN =−0.74
(0.70)
, γ1 = 0.57
(0.27)
, and γ2 = 2.00
(0.62)
.
33
extensive margin of imports. A threat to identification could be that in a year following, for
example, large US foreign portfolio investment, the US exports new things to countries it already
trades with heavily. A further threat to identification could be if the IMF’s Financial Market
Access index reflects reforms in a year that lead to a growth in trade the following year. However,
the index is largely static across the sample period so we suspect this is unlikely.
Table 2.4 reports the results for the instrumental variables regression. The first stage F
statistics confirm the relevance of the instruments for the portfolio equity inflows. Where direct
investment appears in the regression, it is instrumented in exactly the same way. Appendix B.2
shows that the model from section 3 would expect 0.35 for the first regression coefficient in these
tables.
Table 2.4: Instrumental variables regression of extensive margin of imports on investment
inflows and lag of the dependent variable. The final column means that an extra 1000 USD
of portfolio investment predicts 230 USD of extra imports of new varieties. GDP growth is
year-on-year change in each country’s GDP expressed in US dollars. All other variables are
expressed as fractions of GDP. Data cover 2001 to 2015. Data from IMF, World Bank, and
Federal Reserve. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new varieties imported
lag portfolio eq invt 0.442*** 0.443*** 0.453*** 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.230***
[0.0916] [0.0897] [0.0827] [0.101] [0.0976] [0.0856]
lag direct equity invt 0.151 0.0776 -0.175* -0.144*
[0.131] [0.110] [0.100] [0.0870]
lag new imports -0.128 -0.0503
[0.0894] [0.0690]
two lags gdp growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
Observations 252 266 267 252 266 267
R-squared 0.405 0.428 0.434 0.621 0.628 0.665
first stage F-stat 12.7 13.3 13.4 7.2 7.8 7.9
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Intermediate inputs and capital goods
Table 2.5 replaces the dependent (LHS) variable with those least-traded new imports that
are likely to be used as intermediate inputs and capital goods. The UN provides a concordance
between the HS1996 trade data and the system of Broad Economic Classification. The results
show that of the new imports predicted by portfolio equity investment, more than 90% are
categorized by the BEC as intermediate inputs or capital goods. Consequently, we expect these to
affect productivity in the recipient country, and not just utility from consumption variety.
Table 2.5: Regression of extensive margin of intermediate input imports on investment inflows
and a lag of the dependent variable. The final column means that an extra 1000 USD of portfolio
investment predicts 83 USD of extra imports of new intermediates. GDP growth is year-on-year
change in each country’s GDP expressed in US dollars. All other variables are expressed as
fractions of GDP. Data cover 2001 to 2015. Data from IMF, World Bank, and Federal Reserve.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new intermediates imported
lag port eq invt 0.185*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.0865*** 0.0836*** 0.0830***
[0.0319] [0.0309] [0.0307] [0.0230] [0.0289] [0.0287]
lag direct eq invt 0.00207 0.00307 -0.0200 -0.0153
[0.0296] [0.0271] [0.0257] [0.0239]
lagged new inputs -0.0308 -0.0303
[0.0730] [0.0677]
2 lags gdp growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
country f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 252 266 267 252 266 267
R-squared 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.683 0.682 0.682
Table 2.6 duplicates the instrumental variables approach from the previous section, and
applies it to new varieties of imports that are likely to be used as intermediate inputs and capital
goods.
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Table 2.6: Instrumental variables regression of extensive margin of intermediate input imports
on investment inflows and a lag of the dependent variable. The final column means that an extra
1000 USD of portfolio investment predicts 190 USD of extra imports of new intermediates.
GDP growth is year-on-year change in each country’s GDP expressed in US dollars. All other
variables are expressed as fractions of GDP. Data cover 2001 to 2015. Data from IMF, World
Bank, and Federal Reserve. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new intermediates imported
lag portfolio eq invt 0.374*** 0.378*** 0.388*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.190***
[0.0777] [0.0750] [0.0689] [0.0813] [0.0788] [0.0707]
lag direct equity invt 0.149 0.0845 -0.115 -0.0879
[0.112] [0.0920] [0.0800] [0.0703]
lag new inputs -0.125 -0.0372
[0.0951] [0.0705]
two lags gdp growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
Observations 252 266 267 252 266 267
R-squared 0.381 0.412 0.424 0.638 0.643 0.663
first stage F-stat 12.7 13.3 13.4 7.1 7.8 7.9
36
2.3 Structural breaks after equity market liberalizations
A completely different way of asking this question examines the effect of equity market
liberalizations on the extensive margin of imports. Henry (2000) documents 12 episodes when
countries opened their equity markets to foreign investors. Here we examine the 10 for which
there are UN trade data.10 Imports are categorized according to the SITC1 system a the 5 digit
level (because the HS system was not introduced until 1988.) The definition of the extensive
margin is otherwise identical to the preceding.
The extensive margin growth for each country i is regressed on a constant, a time trend,
and lagged Dollar GDP growth, with a break after the country’s liberalization in year Ti. The
estimated equations is
(
S(t)t+1−S(t)t
GDPt
)
i
= αi+δ1 t+ δ2∆GDPi,t
+β1 1(t ≥ Ti)+β2 t 1(t ≥ Ti)+β3 ∆GDPi,t 1(t ≥ Ti)+ εi,t+1. (2.2)
The results for the β coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported in table B.3.
We can see that there is on average more growth in the extensive margin after the liberalization
with a smaller time trend.
The test that the β’s are jointly zero yields a Wald statistic of 3.02. The associated
p-value is 0.03. Therefore we conclude that opening equity markets to foreigners preceded an
increase in new trade. It is of course possible that these equity market liberalizations were timed
coincidentally with other changes in economic policy that drove these results.
An appendix confirms the established fact that portfolio investment is pro-cyclical, or
responds positively price changes.
This new fact, that portfolio investment predicts the extensive margin of imports, and that
10Argentina 1989, Brazil 1988, Chile 1987, Colombia 1991, Korea 1987, Malaysia 1987, Mexico 1989, Philippines
1986, Thailand 1988, Venezuela 1990 are included. India and Taiwan do not have UN trade data for that period.
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Table 2.7: Regression of extensive margin on post-liberalization indicator interactions. Data
cover 10 years up to and after stock market liberalization. Data from World Bank and Henry
(2000). Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
post liberalization extensive margin to GDP
constant 0.594**
[0.275]
time trend -0.000296***
[0.000138]
GDP growth -0.00334
[0.00280]
country fixed effects yes
Observations 200
R-squared 0.52
these new imports are likely productive intermediates is at the core of the model we build, and
has important real economic implications.
2.4 Model
2.4.1 Preview of model
Because the model involves several components, we summarize it here first before fully
presenting it in the next subsection. The model builds on the empirical fact just established: that
equity portfolio flows finance new varieties of imports. First we will describe two economies
in general equilibrium with different levels of technology and solve for the real exchange rate.
Then we will introduce foreign investment in partial equilibrium and show how it alters the real
exchange rate.
There are two countries that produce and consume two final goods, tradeables and non-
tradeables.11 The tradeable final good is a composite of tradeable intermediate inputs. Trade
11Non-tradeable goods here are distinct from the sparsely-traded goods in the preceding section.
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is assumed to be costless, so there is one global price for tradeables. We use tradeables as our
numeraire and normalize the price to one. The relative price of non-tradeables in each economy
thus determines the real exchange rate.
Labor moves freely between sectors, so there is one wage in each country. For simplicity,
nontradeables are produced using purely labor. Tradeables production uses both labor and
intermediate inputs. These assumptions are partly motivated by the Baumol effect (1966), in this
case productivity in nontradeables is static and in tradeables is dynamic.
The two countries are different in the number of varieties of intermediate inputs available,
and also because of an exogenous productivity factor for tradeables production. The poorer
country is assumed to have fewer varieties of intermediate inputs, and a tradeables productivity
factor less than one. The number of varieties is intended to capture countries’ differences in
technology and the productivity factor can capture institutional factors.12
These assumptions alone allow us to derive a real exchange rate in terms of technology
and productivity differences. The two economies are in general equilibrium.
Moving to partial equilibrium, portfolio investment from the richer country is used to
finance imports of new varieties of intermediate inputs into the poorer country. This follows from
a contracting story, that intermediate input producers in the richer country will not export unless
they have an investment in place in the poorer country. An alternative rationale is an impatience
story, by which different discount rates prompt agents in the richer and more patient country
to provide the intermediate inputs. A third interpretation is an information channel by which
domestic tradeables producers only learn about the availability of foreign intermediate inputs if
they have received foreign portfolio investment. The intermediate inputs are sold monopolistically
for tradeables production.
12In reality these intermediate inputs could be intangibles like management practices, or they could be actual
physical goods. The framework here is the same one Paul Romer (1990) used for ideas to explain endogenous
growth which in turn used a model first employed for expiring patents (Judd 1985.) Imports are of course recorded
and therefore we have evidence that the model does apply in the case of physical goods. Naturally, when a foreign
investor buys a portion of the equity in a domestic firm, they likely also seek to improve the management practices.
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These assumptions create the link from foreign investment to technology and therefore to
the real exchange rate.
Foreign investments from the richer country constitute a portfolio of equities. We assume
that this portfolio is leveraged, but a number of portfolio constraints, such as a value-at-risk
limit, would behave similarly. This leverage creates an accelerator effect whereby price changes
precipitate portfolio changes. Investors receive noisy signals about future tradeables productivity
which create exogenous variation in equity prices.
These assumptions generate dynamics for equity prices and consequently for portfolio
investment and in turn the real exchange rate.
2.4.2 Preferences, demands, prices, and the real exchange rate
We have two countries called “USA” and “Mexico” producing and consuming two goods,
tradeables YT and non-tradeables YN . In what follows, we suppress the country superscripts
whenever the equation applies to both countries.
The law of one price holds and there are no transport costs, so we can normalize the price
of the traded good in both countries to PT = 1.
Preferences are characterized by instantaneous Cobb-Douglas utility13
Us =C
γ
T,sC
1−γ
N,s (2.3)
and intertemporal objective function Ut = ∑∞s=t βs−tUs. The corresponding ideal price index is
P = P1−γN , (2.4)
13We use Cobb-Douglas utility to ensure the resulting closed-form expression for the real exchange rate. With
Cobb-Douglas utility, the budget shares on each good are constant fractions, γ and (1− γ) respectively. This means
constant fractions of the labor force produce tradeable and nontradeable goods. With more general CES preferences,
the budget share may be increasing or decreasing in the price of the non-tradeable good, depending on the elasticities.
The fundamental resulting dynamics do not depend, however, on the particular functional form used to represent
preferences.
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given the optimal consumption index C = CγTC
1−γ
N , and demands are given by CT = γPC and
CN = (1− γ)(P/PN)C.
The real exchange rate is therefore
q =
PMEX
PUSA
=
(
PMEXN
PUSAN
)1−γ
. (2.5)
A higher value of q corresponds to a relatively higher price level in Mexico. An increase in q
corresponds to an appreciation of the real exchange rate for Mexico.
2.4.3 Production and the market for intermediate inputs
Labor moves freely between sectors so L = LT +LN in each country.
Production of the non-traded good uses only labor so Y MEXN = A
MEX
N L
MEX
N and Y
USA
N =
AUSAN L
USA
N
Production of the traded good uses intermediates goods x(v) which come in a number
NMEX and NUSA of varieties, where NUSA > NMEX . Traded goods are produced as
YUSAT =
1
α
(∫ NUSA
0
xα(v)dv
)(
LUSAT
)1−α
(2.6)
and as
Y MEXT = A˜
1−α 1
α
(∫ NMEX
0
xα(v)dv
)(
LMEXT
)1−α
, (2.7)
where A˜ < 1 captures institutions relatively less conducive to efficient production. The tilde on A˜
is used to convey that it is a random variable, following a stochastic process. Each input x(v) is
produced each period at a marginal cost α (using the freedom in the units of N) and fully used up
in production that period.
The tradeables producers face a cost p(v) for each variety of input and a wage w for labor,
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so their profit maximization yields input demands
LT = (1−α)YT
w
(2.8)
for labor, and for intermediate inputs
xUSA(v) = pUSA(v)
1
α−1 (1−α)YUSAT /wUSA (2.9)
and
xMEX(v) = A˜ pMEX(v)
1
α−1 (1−α)Y MEXT /wMEX (2.10)
.
The intermediate inputs producers are monopolists maximizing pi(v) = (p(v)−α)x(v)
which yields uniform prices p(v) = 1. So demanded quantities are
xUSA(v) = xUSA = LUSAT , (2.11)
xMEX(v) = xMEX = A˜LMEXT . (2.12)
and intermediate producers’ profits are
piMEX(v) = piMEX = A˜(1−α)LMEXT . (2.13)
2.4.4 Market-clearing
For simplicity, we impose zero net profit for the Mexican intermediates producers. This
means we don’t have to consider where their profits go in the market-clearing for tradeables. We
assume they pay a sunk cost FA˜LT for entry and are forced to exit with probability φ. Zero profit
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follows if φF = (1−α). This is true both in expectation and each period, because there are a
continuum of intermediates producers so the law of large numbers applies.
Mexico’s market-clearing for nontradeables is Y MEXNT = C
MEX
NT and for tradeables is
Y MEXT =C
MEX
T +X , where
X = xNMEX = A˜LMEXT N
MEX (2.14)
. Production simplifies to
Y MEXT = A˜
NMEX
α
LMEXT (2.15)
.
2.4.5 Equilibrium
Mexican wages are w = A˜1−αα N
MEX , so
PMEXN = A˜
1−α
α
NMEX
AMEXN
(2.16)
.
Labor allocations are LT = γL and LNT = (1− γ)L.
If we equalize non-tradeables productivity AMEXN = A
USA
N , we get
q¯ = (
NMEX
NUSA
)1−γA˜1−γ. (2.17)
The real exchange rate is less than one because of lower Mexican productivity in tradeables,
and therefore lower wages, and finally a lower non-tradeables price. This is a classic Balassa-
Samuelson motivation for the real exchange rate. This new closed-form expression for the real
exchange rate separates the effects of differences in technology use, as captured by the number of
intermediate varieties used in production, and differences in more general productivity factors
like institutions.
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2.4.6 Foreign investment
Now we introduce foreign investment into Mexico. Foreign investors can buy and sell an
equity which corresponds to ownership of an importing firm in Mexico. Each firm can import
a unique variety of intermediate input from the USA at marginal cost α and sell it to Mexican
tradeable goods producers at a price of 1. The number of these firms therefore corresponds to the
number of imported intermediate inputs, and we call it Nt . The value, or price, of each equity or
firm we call Vt . Total investment in Mexico is of course NtVt .14
2.4.7 The real exchange rate
Tradeables production uses both domestic varieties and varieties owned by foreign
investors (they add equivalently in the definite integral in (2.7)). So Mexican wages are
wt = A˜t
1−α
α
(NMEX +Nt) (2.18)
and the price of non-tradeables is
PMEXN,t = A˜t
1−α
α
(NMEX +Nt)
AMEXN
. (2.19)
Finally, the real exchange rate, assuming AMEXN = A
USA
N , is
qt = (
NMEX +Nt
NUSA
)1−γA˜1−γt . (2.20)
Here we have a real exchange rate that depends in closed form upon general productivity, local
technology, and foreign technology financed by capital flows.15
14When a US investor buys a new firm or equity, the payment is made in tradeable goods, which then become the
working capital of the new firm. Future profits are remitted to the investor, or added to working capital, in the form
of tradeables also.
15Amiti and Konings (2007) found that lowering tariffs on imported inputs raised productivity in Indonesian
manufacturing, just as imported inputs function in this model.
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2.4.8 Equities valuation
Foreign investors own the right to sell new varieties of intermediate inputs to Mexican
tradeables producers. Unlike domestic Mexican intermediates producers, they face no sunk
cost and forced-exit risk. They earn a profit (1−α) for each input sold. Foreign investors are
risk-neutral, therefore each equity is worth
Vt(v) = Et
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
(
1
1+ r
)s−tpit(v)
]
= (1−α)γLMEX Et
[
∞
∑
s=t+1
A˜s
(1+ r)s−t
]
. (2.21)
2.4.9 Productivity and signal
The log of productivity is assumed to be a random walk with a normally-distributed
innovation, so
zt+1 = zt + εt+1
where εt+1 ∼ N(0,σ2ε) and A˜t = ezt .
There is also a visible signal of next period’s productivity B˜t , whose log, st , has an
uncorrelated normally-distributed error
st = zt+1+ut
where ut ∼ N(0,σ2u).
The minimum mean squared error estimator of zt+1is therefore
σ2u
σ2u+σ2ε
zt +
σ2ε
σ2u+σ2ε
st .
The exponential of this can be written as
A˜
σ2u
σ2u+σ2ε
t B˜
σ2ε
σ2u+σ2ε
t .
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This is a slightly biased estimator of A˜t+1, but that can be corrected by the factor e
− σ2uσ2ε
σ2u+σ2ε
Given this process and this signal, the variety’s expected profit and therefore firm value
can be calculated as
Vt(v) = (1−α)γLMEX e
σ2ε
1+ r− eσ2ε e
− 12
σ2uσ2ε
σ2u+σ2ε A˜
σ2u
σ2u+σ2ε
t B˜
σ2ε
σ2u+σ2ε
t . (2.22)
2.4.10 Foreign investors
Investors start with initial capital Kt and can leverage at a cost r, up to a factor Γ> 1 times
the book value of their assets.
Investors fully leverage to ΓKt =VtNt . Changes in the price of varieties may be due to
either signals about productivity or changes in true productivity. These price changes impact
investor’s capital as
pit+1 = (Vt+1−Vt)Nt− r(Γ−1)Kt . (2.23)
Or in percentage terms as
∆Kt+1
Kt
=
pit+1
Kt
= Γ
Vt+1−Vt
Vt
− r(Γ−1). (2.24)
In the case of a price fall, in order to meet the margin call and satisfy the leverage constraint,
varieties must be sold.16 In the case of a capital gain, investors are able to buy more varieties, up
to the constraint ΓKt+1 =Vt+1Nt+1 determining Nt+1. The dynamics for varieties are
∆Nt+1
Nt
= (Γ−1)∆Vt+1
Vt+1
, (2.25)
16Appendix B.4 derives these relations for asset sales in response to price falls in the presence of a leverage
constraint in more detail.
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where the interest cost has been subsumed into the definition of ∆Vt+1as returns in excess of
interest rates.
To offset these capital flows, the import/export firm is assumed to have a working capital
requirement of 1−αr A˜γL
MEX , which is also redeemed when the firm is closed.
This leverage constraint is identical to a Value-at-Risk constraint, and behaves similarly
to a broader class of portfolio constraints. The key feature is that total investments are a multiple
Γ of investor capital, which is impacted by the performance of those investments. In the case of
Value-at-Risk, Γ is some multiple of the standard deviation of the equity price, but a constant
nonetheless. The constraint is well known in the monetary policy literature for creating the
“financial accelerator (Bernanke et al 1996,) in the macro-finance literature for exacerbating
financial cycles (Adrian and Shin 2014), and in international finance for explaining contagion in
crises (Pavlova and Rigobon 2008.)
2.4.11 Key equations
The key dynamics now are that bad news about productivity causes stock prices to fall.
The financial accelerator of leverage causes equity flows out of the country. These equity flows
destroy technology, reducing productivity. This is turn decreases the real exchange rate. Portfolio
equity investment in the balance of payments data corresponds to Vt∆Nt in this model.
Mexican wages are
wt = A˜t
1−α
α
(NMEX +Nt). (2.26)
The price of non-tradeables is
PMEXN,t = A˜t
1−α
α
(NMEX +Nt)
AMEXN
. (2.27)
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Prices of import/export firm equities are
Vt(v) = (1−α)γLMEX e
σ2ε
1+ r− eσ2ε e
− 12
σ2uσ2ε
σ2u+σ2ε A˜
σ2u
σ2u+σ2ε
t B˜
σ2ε
σ2u+σ2ε
t . (2.28)
Varieties evolve as
∆Nt+1
Nt
= (Γ−1)∆Vt+1
Vt+1
. (2.29)
The real exchange rate, assuming AMEXN = A
USA
N , is
qt = (
NMEX +Nt
NUSA
)1−γA˜1−γt . (2.30)
So even false signals about productivity cause changes in technology and therefore the
real exchange rate. A change in r, A˜, or B˜ changes V in equation (2.26), which in turn changes N
via equation (2.27), which finally impacts the real exchange rate q in equation (2.28).
2.5 Empirical support
2.5.1 Quarterly portfolio investment and the nominal exchange rate
The key equations of the model specify that portfolio investment is predicted to have
a positive effect on the real exchange rate because it finances access to additional varieties of
intermediate inputs which improve productivity in tradeables. In this section we examine the
relationship between inward portfolio investment in equities by foreigners and the log-change in
the exchange rate (all expressed versus the US dollar) for the 18 developing countries examined
in section 2.2.
The model predicts equity portfolio investment will finance new imports of intermediate
inputs which will in turn appreciate the exchange rate. To test this we regress the quarterly
appreciation of the exchange rate on lagged portfolio investment and other lagged variables
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Table 2.8: Regression of change in log exchange rate (appreciation) on lag of inward equity
portfolio investment and lag appreciation. Portfolio investment is expressed as a fraction of
GDP. The last columns implies that an increase of portfolio equity investment equal to 1% of
GDP predicts an appreciation of about 2% in the subsequent quarter. Data cover 18 countries
from Q3 1994 to Q4 2018. Data from IMF, World Bank, and Federal Reserve. Standard errors
in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
appreciation appreciation appreciation appreciation
lagged portfolio investment 0.0187*** 0.0158** 0.0167*** 0.0194***
[0.00650] [0.00644] [0.00630] [0.00626]
lagged appreciation 0.104*** 0.0651** 0.0605** 0.0890***
[0.0271] [0.0270] [0.0266] [0.0276]
lagged fed funds yes yes no no
lagged gdp growth yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects no yes yes no
quarterly fixed effects no no no yes
Observations 1,284 1,284 1,343 1,343
R-squared 0.058 0.130 0.128 0.245
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detailed in Table 2.8. The last columns implies that an increase of portfolio equity investment
equal to 1% of GDP predicts an appreciation of about 2% in the subsequent quarter.
We can be sure with 99% confidence that according to the best linear forecast, increased
portfolio investment in a quarter will increase the forecast appreciation in the following quarter.
This may be because equity investors have some timing skill and know which economies
will grow more in the future. Nonetheless it is confirmation that portfolio flows procyclically
predict exchange rates, as predicted in the model. This result is distinct from the known in-sample
correlations between equity flows, prices, and exchange rates attributed to portfolio rebalancing,
as in e.g. Hau and Rey (2004.)
Exchange rates are notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to predict. Therefore this
result is remarkable, suggesting that the model has some use in explaining the dynamics of these
countries.
The counterargument would be that equity flows to these countries for the same reasons
that their exchange rates subsequently appreciate. This implies that equity investors have special
knowledge that foreign exchange traders do not, and argues that foreign exchange markets are
inefficient. As unrealistic as this argument may be a priori, we aim to rule it out empirically. It is
possible to instrument as before in section 2.2 for developing inflows with developed outflows.
The estimating equation for the first-stage of the instrumental variables regression is
In f lowsi,t
GDPi,t
= αi+βJapan
Out f lowsJapan,t
GDPi,t
Indexsharei
+ βUK
Out f lowsUK,t
GDPi,t
Indexsharei+βUSA
Out f lowsUSA,t
GDPi,t
Indexsharei+ εt .
The sample includes periods before and after the creation of the Euro, so we use only the UK to
represent flows from Europe. The idea is to approximate what fraction of outflows would go to
each destination country. This should depend on the destination’s share in a global equity index.
This share is calculated from the World Bank data on total equity market capitalization. Outflows
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are portfolio acquisition of all portfolio equities in the developed countries’ financial accounts.
Data are quarterly. Inflows are equity portfolio investment as before.
In Table 2.9 we report the results of the instrumental variables regression. First stage
F-statistics confirm relevance of the instruments. The results are imprecise in some specifications,
but those that are statistically significant strongly confirm the sign of the effect. The third column
can be interpreted to say that an extra 1% of GDP of equity portfolio inflows predicts a 10%
appreciation in the subsequent quarter.
Table 2.9: Instrumental variables regression of change in log exchange rate (appreciation) on
lag of inward equity portfolio investment and lag appreciation. Portfolio investment is expressed
as a fraction of GDP. Data cover 18 countries from Q3 1994 to Q4 2018. The third column
can be interpreted to say that an extra 1% of GDP of equity portfolio inflows predicts a 10%
appreciation in the subsequent quarter. Data from IMF, World Bank, and Federal Reserve.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
appreciation appreciation appreciation appreciation
lagged portfolio investment -0.0482 0.0898* 0.0987** -0.0256
[0.0515] [0.0473] [0.0443] [0.135]
lagged appreciation 0.223*** 0.0646 0.0582 0.183**
[0.0520] [0.0481] [0.0469] [0.0825]
lagged fed funds yes yes no no
lagged gdp growth yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects no yes yes no
quarterly fixed effects no no no yes
Observations 1,112 1,112 1,112 1,112
R2 0.0221 0.0369 0.0363 0.1479
First-stage F statistic 8.45 7.12 11.6 9.58
2.5.2 Real exchange rates and new varieties
To investigate the model’s mechanism more directly, we look at the long-term empirical
relationship between the real exchange rate and new varieties of imports for 21 developing
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countries17. Changes in log real exchange rates (with the price level corresponding to household
and government consumption) come from the Penn World Tables (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer
2014) for the years 1984-2014. We have to use the SITC1 system for import classification to go
this far back in time, meaning there are only 838 categories. Portfolio and direct equity investment
data again come from the IMF Balance of Payments database.
Table 2.10: Regression of log real exchange rate change on extensive margin of imports and
investment inflows. Data cover 1984 to 2014. GDP growth is expressed in US dollars. New
varieties imported and equity investment are expressed as a fraction of GDP. The final column
can be interpreted to say that an extra 1% of GDP of new imports is expected to coincide with a
10% real appreciation. Data from Penn World Table, IMF, World Bank, and Federal Reserve.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
change in real exchange rate
new varieties imports 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.149*** 0.118*** 0.121*** 0.103***
[0.020] [0.019] [0.017] [0.024] [0.023] [0.019]
lag portfolio eq invt 0.350 0.363 -0.114 -0.096
[0.560] [0.555] [0.592] [0.588]
lag direct equity invt 0.353 0.519
[0.423] [0.465]
lagged GDP growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fed Funds and lag yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects yes yes yes
R2 0.54 0.53 0.31 0.59 0.58 0.36
observations 410 421 561 410 421 561
Table 2.10 shows regressions of the change in real exchange rate on new varieties of
imports (as a fraction of GDP), with and without year fixed effects. There is strong statistical
evidence that a country importing more new goods is likely to experience a real appreciation.
Column 6 can be interpreted to say that an extra 1% of GDP of new imports is expected to
coincide with a 10% real appreciation.
In columns 2 and 5, we ask if lagged portfolio equity investment has a statistically
significant additional effect on the real exchange rate, and find that it does not. This means we do
17Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
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not reject the hypothesis that the new imports channel is how portfolio equity investment affects
the real exchange rate.
2.6 Parametrization and magnitudes
In this section, we parametrize the model and ask approximately how important this
channel is. Table 2.11 contains the minimum parametrization necessary for the applications
that follow. This exercise is not a rigorous calibration, but rather an approximation to possible
magnitudes. This portfolio investment channel can explain the majority of excess real exchange
rate volatility compared to developed countries. The parametrized model also explains approxi-
mately 20% of the real depreciations seen in the “taper tantrum.”
2.6.1 Parameters
Stockman and Tesar (1995) found γ= 0.5, the share of consumption spent on tradeable
goods. Engel (1999) found estimates between 0.22 and 0.64 for the share of non-tradeable
consumption in developed countries, so this parameter is clearly subject to much uncertainty
and depends on the precise definition and method of estimation. We use γ= 0.4 to reflect that
these countries consume relatively more simple products. We further assume the capital share in
tradeables production α= 0.35.
Table 2.11: Parameters for estimation of magnitudes. Author’s calculations.
parameter description value
γ tradeables share in consumption 0.4
α intermediates share in tradeables production 0.35
xNt
PYY
intermediate input imports to GDP 0.21
Γ−1 positive feedback from prices to flows 0.05
Average real exchange rates for the countries in the sample gives qt . Penn World Tables
(Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2014) for 2011 report an average qt (for consumption) of 0.55.
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Hall and Jones (1999) instrument for social infrastructure and find a range for A˜t between 0.27
and 0.93. I will assume 0.8. The closed form expression for the real exchange rate (2.30) was
qt = (
NMEX +Nt
NUSA
)1−γA˜1−γt (2.31)
. This then estimates
NMEX +Nt
NUSA
= 0.46 (2.32)
for the ratio of varieties available in Mexico to those in the USA.
Market clearing in tradeables was
Y MEXT =C
MEX
T + x(N
MEX +Nt). (2.33)
This implied
x(NMEX +Nt) =
α
1−αCT . (2.34)
Dividing by GDP yields
x(NMEX +Nt)
CT +PNCN
=
α
1−α
CT
CT +PNCN
=
α
1−αγ (2.35)
from the γ budget-share in tradeables resulting from the Cobb-Douglas preferences.
The first term from equation (2.35), xNtCT+PNCN , is intermediate input imports to GDP. The
ratio of imports to GDP is 35% on average across the previous 18 countries as reported by the
World Bank. Furthermore, Johnson (2014) reports 60% of world trade is in intermediate imports.
Therefore we combine these as
xNt
GDP
=
imports
GDP
intermediates
imports
= 0.35∗0.6 = 0.21. (2.36)
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These first 3 parameters from Table 2.11 thus determine all of the N ratios: N
MEX
NUSA ,
Nt
NUSA , and
Nt
NMEX .
The dependence of the real exchange rate on imported varieties (2.30) was
qt = (
NMEX +Nt
NUSA
)1−γA˜1−γ (2.37)
.
Differencing gives
∆qt
qt
= (1− γ) ∆Nt
Nt +NMEX
, (2.38)
which shows the percent change in the real exchange rate as a function of the change in foreign
equity holdings. Furthermore
∆Nt
Nt +NMEX
=
Nt
Nt +NMEX
∆Nt
Nt
. (2.39)
Combining the above estimates, we calculate
∆qt
qt
= 0.59
∆Nt
Nt
. (2.40)
Finally we need to make use of (2.29)
∆Nt
Nt
= (Γ−1) ∆Vt
Vt+1
. (2.41)
What fraction of foreign equities are sold in response to a 1% price drop? Previous studies track
individual portfolios to measure the magnitudes of positive feedback trading. Froot, O’Connell,
and Seasholes (2001) report 0.05 for (Γ− 1) over 3 months after a price change. Kaminsky,
Lyons, and Schmukler (2004) found 0.025 and Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) found similar. We
will use 0.05.
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There also exists a theoretical literature on international macroeconomic linkages that use
an equivalent estimate of (Γ−1) between 2 and 5 (for example Aiyagari and Gertler 1999 or
Devereux and Yetman 2010.) This is motivated either by a 25% margin requirement at exchanges
or by a similar recovery rate in the event of default, in the style of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997.) A
parameter of this magnitude in this model would make this channel hugely important.
Putting it all together we get
∆qt
qt
= 0.029
∆Vt
Vt
. (2.42)
2.6.2 Interest Rate Shock
In 2013, the US Federal Reserve hinted that they would taper their purchases of govern-
ment bonds and mortgage-backed securities. The resulting rise in yields, and spillover effects were
dubbed the “taper tantrum.” Figure 2.4 plots the real interest rate on a Treasury Inflation-Protected
Security with 30 years to maturity.
Figure 2.4: 30yr constant maturity real yields. Constructed by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve from treasury inflation-protected securities.
Previous literature on this episode are limited to an event study by Chari, Stedman, and
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Lundblad (2017) which identified monetary policy shocks from treasuries futures data and showed
that developing countries’ equity prices were sensitive to US interest rates.
Here we ask what our model would imply from the taper tantrum. Suppose the risk-
adjusted real interest rate used for discounting equities’ cashflows increases from 0.5% to 1.5%.
From equation for equity prices we find ∆VV =−67%.
Now from equation (2.42), we calculate ∆qq = −2.0%. Figure 1 showed real exchange
rates in 2013 which depreciated on average by around 10%.
A key result here is that developing countries’ exchange rates are affected by the world
interest rate through a channel distinct from uncovered interest parity. For example, the Mexican
central bank maintained a constant interest rate differential to the US during the relevant period
and still the Mexican peso depreciated considerably. The model developed in this paper can
explain this via the equity valuation and portfolio investment channel.
2.6.3 Volatility
We now return to the question of excess volatility with which we began. The model
illustrates the channel that transmits equity price volatility to real exchange rate volatility, via
portfolio constraints and the real effects of portfolio equity investment. The calibrated model, and
equation (2.42) specifically, means that all else constant
σ(qt) = 0.029σ(Vt).
Stock market indices for these 18 countries have a dollar price standard deviation σ(Vt)
of about 30%. Schiller (1981) estimated that 80% of volatility in the S&P 500 was not justified
by volatility in dividends. If we consider this estimate as non-fundamental noise, we have 24%
excess volatility σ(Vt) for stock prices. This calibrated model implies that this would contribute
0.7% to the standard deviation of the real exchange rate. Returning to table 2.1, we saw that most
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real exchange rates had an excess volatility of less than 1.4% compared to the US real exchange
rate.
We suggest that this equity portfolio channel explains a significant part, perhaps a majority,
of excess exchange rate volatility in developing countries.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has detailed a new channel of real exchange rate volatility for developing
countries importing foreign technology. Constrained portfolios of equities held by foreign
investors finance access to new technology. This investment can reverse in the case of bad news
and therefore equity price falls. The fall in productivity in tradeables production generates a real
exchange rate depreciation.
The mechanism in this paper is purely real and does not point to suboptimal monetary
policy decisions. The amplification of volatility is endogenous to the model. The expression for
the real exchange rate is in closed form, and shows clearly the role of foreign portfolio flows.
We establish a new fact, that portfolio flows, and not direct investment flows, facilitate
imports of new varieties of goods. We incorporate this fact into a full model of portfolio flows
and the real economy.
Turning to quarterly data, we confirm that the exchange rate responds positively to lagged
equity portfolio investment in concurrence with the key equations of the model. This combined
with the existence of portfolio constraints contributes to explaining the endogenous volatility of
real exchange rates.
Furthermore, we find that over a 30 year period, real exchange rates appreciate when more
new goods are imported. The previous year’s portfolio equity investment does not significantly
additionally affect the real exchange rate, suggesting that the new imports channel is important.
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Chapter 3
Foreign ownership and productivity of
Chilean manufacturers
3.1 Introduction
Purchases of equity stakes in firms by foreign investors are categorized in the balance of
payments as either foreign direct investment (FDI) or foreign portfolio investment (FPI.) Foreign
direct investment and portfolio investment are differentiated by a 10% control threshold, such that
purchasing the first 9% of a firm’s equity constitutes portfolio investment, for example, and then
purchasing an additional 2% constitutes direct investment. FDI has been considered generally
beneficial for recipient countries and governments in both developing and industrialized countries
go to great lengths to attract those investments. Portfolio investment, also called “hot money”, is
regarded more warily.
Alburquerque (2003) documents many facts comparing FDI and FPI. FDI is lumpy in the
sense that investments are mostly large, and persistent through downturns. Portfolio investment is
fluid in the sense that it can be of any size, and transient in the sense that it can quickly reverse.
Thank you to Natalia Ramondo for kindly sharing data and code.
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Portfolio investment has persistently grown in magnitudes relative to FDI over the past 10 years.
Specifically in the IMF Balance of Payments Database, total direct investment is always positive,
whereas total portfolio investment was negative in 2008 and has since grown to exceed direct
investment in both 2017 and 2018.1
Whilst the beneficial impacts of foreign investors have been well documented, it remains
unknown at what level of foreign ownership these effects matter. We investigate the marginal
impacts of additional foreign ownership in Chilean manufacturing plants in the years 1998 to
2001. This question is important because the answer may imply real outcomes from portfolio
investment and affects optimal policy.
We find significant effects of foreign ownership on (log) total factor productivity (TFP)
in levels, changes, and also when controlling for endogeneity between the investment and the
recipient plants’ productivity, using an instrumental variables approach.
All forms of foreign investment allow introduction of foreign technologies, which are
believed to be a significant source of growth. For example, Eaton and Kortum (1999) estimate
that half of US productivity growth comes from foreign technology. We expect an even greater
fraction in smaller and less developed countries.
One widely studied channel is that foreign firms’ new imports have related technology
effects (Keller 2002.) Spillover productivity effects within industries were documented in the UK
(Haskel, Pereira, Slaughter 2004 and Girma and Wakelin 2001), the US (Keller and Yeaple 2002),
and Chile (Ramondo 2009.) Our contribution is to examine the level of foreign ownership that
matters for beneficial effects.
Goldstein and Razin (2006) compare principal-agent differences between FDI and FPI.
Contracting and monitoring problems would cause a preference for FDI, which indicates control.
Portfolio investment may involve transfer of management practices, although this important
channel has not been stressed in the literature. Investors meet with management and give
1The specific series examined are called ”Net incurrence of liabilities in equity and investment fund shares” for
both direct and portfolio investment.
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recommendations during earnings conference calls (). And free advice is known to improve
productivity (). But we know of no literature that combines these facts to conclude that portfolio
investmnet affects management practices and, in turn, productivity.
Differences between foreign owned and domestic firms are long-studied. Caves (1974)
finds majority foreign owned firms in Canada and Australia were more profitable. Blomstro¨m
(1986) shows that sectors with higher foreign ownership produce more value added per worker.
Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) show that foreign firms pay higher wages in Mexico,
Venezuela, and the United States. Aitken and Harrison (1999) regress output on inputs and
foreign ownership and report positive effects for levels of foreign ownership. Our contribution, in
contrast, is to look at TFP with respect to a continuous measure of foreign ownership and to ask
if low levels are significant and therefore if portfolio investment is important for productivity.
There is much literature on FDI, and less on portfolio investment, but some literature
on FDI may be relevant to portfolio investment. For example, Javorcik (2004) studies foreign
ownership of Lithuanian firms and although the paper predominantly refers to FDI, the ownership
variable has a mean of 7.8% and a standard deviation of 23%, indicating that a considerable
portion of the foreign investment flow was portfolio investment and not direct investment. Javorcik
finds increased productivity in recipient firms and their suppliers.
Manova (2008) showed that portfolio investment after equity market liberalizations
facilitated increased exporting for credit constrained firms. This additional access to capital is a
distinct channel from the total factor productivity that we examine.
We examine the relationship between the level of foreign ownership and the log of TFP,
first by ordinary least squares and then with a local linear regression. We find TFP increases with
foreign ownership, especially at lower levels of the foreign ownership share. We then show that
increases in foreign ownership coincide with increases in TFP. This is true even when restricting
the sample to low levels of initial foreign ownership and to small increases, for example a less
than 10% initial share and an increase of less than 10%. Next we control for endogeneity in the
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foreign investment decision by instrumenting with total portfolio outflows from high-income
countries interacted with initial plant size and industry dummies and confirm that the relationship
remains. Finally we ask if plants with partial foreign ownership produce differently and show
that the share of intermediate inputs imported increases in foreign ownership.
The rest if this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses productivity measure-
ment, from the basic problem identified by Marschak and Andrews (1944) to more recent solutions.
Section 3 discusses the econometrics of kernel regression. Section 4 discusses the data and how it
is analyzed. Section 5 presents the main empirical results. Finally section 6 concludes.
3.2 Productivity measurement
3.2.1 Production
Consider a plant panel with plants i, over time periods t, with a Cobb-Douglas value-added
production functions
Yit = AitKαit L
β
it (3.1)
where observable capital input is K, labor input L, and unobservable productivity A. In logs the
production function becomes
yit = ait +αkit +βlit (3.2)
where the capital share α and labor share β now appear as if regression coefficients. If we were to
try to run a regression of the form
yit = a¯+αkit +βlit + εit (3.3)
then consistency would require E [εit |kit , lit ] = 0. However, since profit maximizing plants would
choose to employ more capital and labor in response to positive productivity changes, this
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conditional mean independence is certainly violated and OLS estimates are biased. This problem
has been known and discussed since at least Marschak and Andrews (1944.)
3.2.2 Tornqvist and Malmqvist productivity indices
If markets for capital and labor are competitive, plants will employ factors such that
marginal revenue products equal marginal costs. These first order conditions in the Cobb-Douglas
case are α= rK/Y and β= wL/Y for capital costs r and wages w. In both cases the numerator is
total cost of the factor in each period (and of course in the special case of constant returns to scale,
α+β= 1 and total cost equals output, for zero profits). The log production function (3.2) can be
time differenced as
ait−ait−1 = yit− yit−1+α(kit− kit−1)+β(lit− lit−1) (3.4)
to measure changes in total factor productivity.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics follows this method and uses what is called the Tornqvist
index to measure TFP changes by industry, with cost shares averaged over both periods (BLS
2015).
Christensen, Caves, and Diewert (1982) show that an average of Malmqvist indices for
input and output is equivalent to a Tornqvist index under constant returns to scale. The Malmqvist
index compares the minimum inputs required to produce a fixed output or the maximum output
producible from a fixed input. These notions of distances in efficiency become useful when
examining input-output data without prices (e.g. Fa¨re, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang 1994).
Rather than assume a production function, Christensen et al. assume a parametric form
of the production possibility frontier. This translog PPF is a local second-order approximation
to any production function and is more flexible than the well known production functions with
constant elasticities of substitution and transformation (Christensen Jorgensen Lau 1973).
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In our data, we do not see payments to capital. Therefore we have two ways of calculating
a Tornqvist index. We can assume constant returns to scale, in which case the shares sum to one
and α is inferred from the other shares. Or we can assume that the user cost of capital is steady
with real interest rates and depreciation both approximately 10%, so α= 0.2K/Y . Both methods
yield similar results and are shown as robustness checks in Appendix C.2. 2
3.2.3 The Levinsohn-Petrin approach
Levinsohn and Petrin (2004, henceforth LP) assume that plants are unable to adjust labor
inputs at impact in response to within-period productivity shocks. LP assume that plants do adjust
usage of intermediate inputs at impact, and therefore use an intermediate input to control for
productivity shocks observable to the plant. Their method was adapted from that of Olley and
Pakes (1997) who used investment instead, but in a similar way. The advantage of intermediates
over investment is that intermediates are more plausibly smooth and monotonically increasing in
productivity, both of which are necessary for invertibility.
We assume that productivity is composed of a component, observable to the plant,
governed by a Markov process, and an unobservable mean-zero error term
ait = ωit +ηit , (3.5)
where E [ηit |kit , lit ,ωit ] = 0 and ωit = E [ωit |ωit−1]+νit . Because capital kit and intermediates
mit are assumed to be increasing in the observable-to-the-plant productivity ωit , that relation
can be inverted and we can write ωit = p(kit,mit), some polynomial function of arbitrary degree.
2The Tornqvist productivity changes are calculated from gross output, with intermediates in the Cobb-Douglas
production function. For the other productivity measures we will use intermediates as instruments and productivity
will be calculated from value-added in production.
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Substituting into 3.2, we can write
yit = αkit +βlit +ωit +ηit , (3.6)
and then
yit = αkit +βlit + p(kit ,mit)+ηit , (3.7)
where p is a polynomial of arbitrary degree. Now the labor share β can be estimated to give a βˆ
by OLS with this specification, including polynomial terms in kit and mit .
The next step is to solve for observable productivity ωit and the unobservable error as a
function of the capital share α, from (3.6)
̂(ωit +ηit) = yit− αˆkit− βˆlit . (3.8)
Now for the correct αˆ, this series was assumed to be Markov, so we write
̂(ωit +ηit) = p˜( ̂(ωit−1+ηit−1); αˆ)+ ξˆit , (3.9)
again some new polynomial p˜ of arbitrary degree, for each αˆ, and E [ξit |kit−1, lit−1,ωit−1] = 0. βˆ
has already been estimated, and for any possible αˆ, there is a corresponding p˜(; αˆ) and ξˆit . This
procedure ultimately leads to
αˆ= argmin(∑
it
ξˆ2it). (3.10)
The idea of the algorithm is that each αˆ generates a corresponding polynomial p˜, which in turn
generates a series of innovations ξˆit . The intuition is that the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator jointly
minimizes the errors in the production function and in the plants’ forecasts of their next period
productivity.
Olley and Pakes (1997) specifically model entry and exit. They find the effect insignificant
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and consequently, Levinsohn and Petrin omit this selection effect and we follow their example. In
aggregate, we expect plant selection endogeneity to bias down the the capital coefficient because
plants with more invested capital are less likely to exit when productivity is low. Van Beveren
(2007) reviews these issues and point to the irrelevance of selection in the case of Belgian firms.
3.2.4 The Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer approach
Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015, henceforth ACF) show that if labor does adjust to
capital and plant-observable productivity then the labor share β is not identified in (3.7). ACF
begin with the same model, but at (3.6) they do not keep the βˆ as the labor share. Instead they
estimate
yit = αkit +βlit + p(kit , lit ,mit)+ηit , (3.11)
yielding βˆ′ and some polynomial pˆ. This then defines a new polynomial p′ from
yit = βˆ′lit + p′(kit , lit ,mit)+ηit . (3.12)
From this and (3.6) we can write
ω̂it +ηit = p′(kit , lit ,mit)−αkit .
Now we use the Markov property again to define a third polynomial
̂(ωit +ηit) = p˜( ̂(ωit−1+ηit−1))+ξit = p˜(p′(kit−1, lit−1,mit−1)−αkit−1)+ξit .
Finally, to estimate this p˜, jointly with βˆ and αˆ, we return to (3.6) and estimate
yit = αkit +βlit + p˜(p′(kit−1, lit−1,mit−1)−αkit−1)+ξit . (3.13)
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This ACF estimate of productivity is used in Appendix C.3 as a robustness check.
3.2.5 GMM framework
Wooldridge (2009) showed how these productivity measures can all be estimated in a
GMM framework. From (3.6), we had
yit = αkit +βlit +ωit +ηit , (3.14)
and we assume ωit = g(kit ,mit) and the Markov property ωit = E [ωi|ωit−1] + ξit or ωit =
f (g(kit−1,mit−1))+ξit . This yields
yit = αkit +βlit +E [ωi|ωit−1]+ξit +ηit . (3.15)
Or substituting in functions to be estimated the innovations are
ηit = yit−αkit−βlit−g(kit ,mit), (3.16)
and
ξit +ηit = yit−αkit−βlit− f (g(kit−1,mit−1)). (3.17)
.
The moment conditions for ACF are
E
ηit

kit
lit
mit

= 0. (3.18)
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and
E

(ξit +ηit)

kit
kit−1
lit−1
mit−1


= 0. (3.19)
Additional lags of the regressors can be added to both moment conditions to identity the
coefficients on the polynomials which estimate fˆ and gˆ. The difference between ACF and
LP is that LP includes lit with the second moment condition (3.19).
There are of course additional approaches to plant productivity estimation. For example,
we could imagine including foreign ownership directly in this step. However, we choose to follow
these traditional approaches for comparability to the literature on FDI and productivity.
3.3 Estimation strategy
3.3.1 Ordinary Least Squares
We begin by showing that foreign owned plant are more productive and look simply at
levels of log TFP with regressions of the form
ai jrt = β f oreigni jrt +α j +αr +αt + εi jrt (3.20)
where plant i is in industry j, region r, at year t. Industries are listed in appendix C.1. Standard
errors are clustered by plant. Estimation of changes in log TFP are of the form
∆ai jrt = β1∆ f oreigni jrt +β2 sizei jr,t−1+β3 ai jr,t−1+α j +αr +αt−1+ εi jrt (3.21)
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again with standard errors clustered by plant. The notation ∆t represents the change between
years t−1 and t.
3.3.2 Local linear regressions
In this paper, we investigate at what levels foreign ownership and its changes become
important. Consequently we are interested in the shape of the curve when we plot, for example,
productivity versus foreign ownership. The natural tool here is a nonparametric regression.
Suppose we start with data generated by a non-linear function of independent variables xi,
as
yi = g(xi)+ εi, (3.22)
with E [εi|xi] = 0. Consequently E [yi|xi] = g(xi).
The local linear regression method developed by Cleveland (1979) fits a weighted linear
regression at each observation xi, so
gi(x) = αi+βi(x− xi). (3.23)
One nice feature of this model is that ĝ′(xi) = β̂i estimates ∂E[y|x]∂x |xi .
The local parameters αˆi and βˆi are chosen to solve the weighted least squares problem
min
n
∑
j=1
{y j−αi−βi(x j− xi)}2K(x j,xi;h), (3.24)
where K is a kernel function to weight nearer observations more heavily, and h is a bandwidth
parameter determining how severely to overweight nearer observations relative to farther ones. In
this paper we use cross-validation to determine the bandwidth parameter. This means that we
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minimize, over bandwidth, the sum of squared residuals h
hˆ = argmin
h
n
∑
i=1
(yi− gˆi(xi))2 (3.25)
where gˆi is the non-linear function fit from the n−1 data points excluding observation i (this is
called “leave one out” cross-validation.) Li and Racine (2004) show convergence and asymptotic
normality of this method in the case with both continuous and discrete regressors, as we have in
our setting.
We employ this method because we are interested in the response of the dependent
variable, log TFP, at quantiles of the independent variable, foreign ownership. So this is like the
converse of quantile regression that examines the response of quantiles of the dependent variable
to a continuous independent variable.
3.4 Data
The plant level data comes from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Annual, or yearly
country-wide manufacturing census published by Chile’s national statistics institute. This survey
provides us with plant’s own reporting of total revenues, wage expenditures, intermediate input
costs, investment, the value of fixed assets, and the 4-digit ISIC industry classification. This
dataset was used by Liu (1992) and Tybout, DeMelo, and Corbo (1991) to study productivity in
these plants, especially around trade liberalizations, and Pavcnik (2002) who modeled plant entry
and exit to study those industry productivity dynamics.
The raw data is analyzed following Ramondo (2009).. Value-added is calculated as the
difference between total revenues and total expenditures on raw materials (intermediate inputs
and energy.) All variables are real, deflated with 1996 as a base year. Total revenues are deflated
by the 3-digit industry price deflator. A corresponding national price deflator is used for each of
national and imported raw materials. Finally, electricity and fuels are deflated by the national
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intermediate inputs deflator.
The labor employed is measured by the total wage payments because our dataset does not
contain the preferred measure of total hours worked. This follows Javorcik (2004) who calls these
labor “efficiency units.” The capital stock of each plant is calculated by the perpetual inventory
method. Capital is tracked by starting with reported book-value in 1992, and then following a
standard law of motion for capital. Depreciation is assumed to be constant. Investment is deflated
by an investment price deflator.
We restrict the sample to ISIC2 industries between 310 and 399, which corresponds to
manufacturing. We will consider industries at the 3-digit level, so we have 27 distinct industries.
These industries and their frequency in our data are listed in Appendix C.1.
We use electricity as the intermediate inputs to instrument for plant productivity with the
Levinsohn-Petrin method, where the production function is estimated at the 2-digit ISIC2 level.
Then we generate aˆit , or log TFP for each plant.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for manufacturing plants in Chile 1998-2001. TFP is calculated
by the Levinsohn-Petrin method with electricity use as proxy for plant-observed productivity.
Plant level data from ENIA published by INE.
Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
foreign 15,454 0.0492 0.204 0 1
∆ foreign 10,178 -0.00012 0.0985 -1 1
log TFP 14,423 2.0165 1.1150 -7.5464 7.8215
∆ log TFP 9,366 -0.0173 0.7146 -5.2290 8.5335
import share 15,404 0.0482 0.111 0 1
The 10,178 observations with a change in foreign ownership represent 4096 distinct
manufacturing plants. Of these, the majority (over 90%) are entirely domestic in all years. There
are 304 plants with some foreign ownership. These plants provide the variation that will determine
our key results. The wholly domestic plants only provide more precise estimates of the average
productivity by region, year, and industry. Our results contrast the foreign owned plants against
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these averages.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 OLS in levels
We begin with levels to establish basic facts about the data. Table 3.2 reports results of
regressions of log TFP of the form
ai jrt = β f oreigni jrt +α j +αr +αt + εi jrt . (3.26)
Standard errors are clustered by plant. The first column shows that productivity is increasing
in foreign ownership. The second column shows that the square of foreign ownership is not
statistically significant. This lack of clear non-linearity is evidence against the idea that only large
fractions of foreign ownership are important.
Table 3.3 shows results of regressions with an identical specification, however on restricted
samples. In column 1 the sample is restricted to plants that report foreign ownership less than
10%, in column 2 we restrict to plants with less than 20% ownership, and so on. The result
shows that log TFP is increasing in levels of foreign ownership, even at low levels of that foreign
ownership.
3.5.2 Local linear regressions
In this section we fit local linear regressions of the form
ai jrt = g( f oreigni jrt)+α j +αr +αt + εi jrt . (3.27)
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Table 3.2: Regression of log TFP on foreign ownership with fixed effects by year, region, and
3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering 1998-2001. Robust standard errors clustered
by plant in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2)
TFP LP TFP LP
foreign 0.417*** 0.704
[0.064] [0.432]
foreign2 -0.303
[0.443]
Observations 14,423 14,423
R-squared 0.541 0.541
Table 3.3: Regression of log TFP on foreign ownership with fixed effects by year, region,
and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Columns 1-5 restrict the sample to those plants with foreign
ownership less than 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% respectively. Data from INE covering
1998-2001. Robust standard errors clustered by plant in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
for<10% for<20% for<30% forn<40% for<50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP LP
foreign 6.212 3.969** 2.867*** 1.830*** 0.906***
[3.813] [1.581] [0.741] [0.475] [0.270]
Observations 13,585 13,619 13,658 13,695 13,791
R-squared 0.546 0.546 0.547 0.547 0.545
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We aim to explore in a non-parametric specification, precisely which levels of foreign ownership
are associated with higher productivity.
Table 3.4 reports conditional means of log TFP for different levels of foreign ownership,
as well as the conditional derivatives g′( f oreign). Standard errors are computed by bootstrap
with 200 replications and we believe have converged because look indistinguishable from a run of
100 replications. The number of observations as well as many discrete covariates as fixed effects
makes this computationally intensive.
We note that the differential level effect of foreign ownership is greatest at low levels of
foreign ownership. Furthermore, total factor productivity peaks around 40\% foreign ownership
in this specification.
Table 3.4: Local linear regression of log TFP on foreign ownership. Fixed effects by year,
region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering 1998-2001. Standard errors
computed by bootstrap with 200 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
margin of foreign ownership conditional mean TFP conditional derivative
0% 1.998*** 0.445***
[0.009] [0.060]
10% 2.214*** 0.443***
[0.097] [0.060]
20% 2.339*** 0.441***
[0.180] [0.059]
40% 2.594*** 0.438***
[0.115] [0.059]
60% 2.438*** 0.436***
[0.258] [0.059]
80% 1.930*** 0.433***
[0.432] [0.059]
Observations 14,423
R-squared 0.585
74
3.5.3 OLS in changes
Table 3.5 reports results of regressions of the form
∆ai jrt = β1∆ f oreigni jrt +β2 sizei jr,t−1+β3 ai jr,t−1+α j +αr +αt−1+ εi jrt . (3.28)
Standard errors are clustered by plant. The first column shows that increases in foreign ownership
coincide with increases in total factor productivity. The final column shows that the square of the
change in foreign ownership is not statistically significant. This is consistent with the idea that
large ownership shares do not carry additional importance for productivity improvements.
Table 3.5: Change in log TFP on change in foreign ownership. Fixed effects by year, region,
and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering 1998-2001. Robust standard errors
clustered by plant in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (5)
∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP ACF ∆ TFP TQV ∆ TFP LP
∆ foreign 0.259*** 0.130 0.123 0.261***
[0.096] [0.101] [0.192] [0.095]
TFP −1 -0.504*** -0.512*** -0.014*** -0.504***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.001] [0.019]
size−1 0.111*** 0.031*** -0.012* 0.110***
[0.016] [0.009] [0.007] [0.016]
(∆ foreign)2 0.166
[0.117]
Observations 9,366 9,366 6,899 9,366
R-squared 0.307 0.277 0.241 0.307
Next, we restrict the sample of plants in order to investigate for which plants these effects
remain significant. Table 3.6 restricts the sample to plants that report foreign ownership less than
10%-50% in the previous year in columns 1-5 respectively.
Table 3.7 restricts the sample to plants that report less than 10% in the previous period,
and then restricts the sample further to plants who reported changes in foreign ownership less than
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Table 3.6: Change in log TFP on change in foreign ownership. Columns 1-5 correspond to
restricting to levels of lagged foreign ownership less than 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%. Fixed
effects by year, region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering 1998-2001.
Robust standard errors clustered by plant in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
for−1 <10% for−1 <20% for−1 <30% forn−1 <40% for−1 <50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP
∆ foreign 0.428** 0.430** 0.453*** 0.421** 0.406**
[0.174] [0.173] [0.173] [0.168] [0.159]
TFP−1 -0.498*** -0.498*** -0.498*** -0.496*** -0.497***
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
size−1 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.123***
[0.025] [0.023] [0.020] [0.019] [0.018]
Observations 8,834 8,855 8,877 8,902 8,957
R-squared 0.303 0.303 0.302 0.301 0.301
10%-50% in columns 1-5 respectively. We draw particular attention to table 3.7, column 1, where
we see that for plants with less than 10% foreign ownership that receive an increase in foreign
ownership less than 10%, total factor productivity increases in a magnitude that is both relatively
large and statistically significant. Specifically, we find that for the firms in this subsample, a 1%
increase in foreign ownership is expected to coincide with an extra 3.8% increase in total factor
productivity.
Table 3.8 restricts the sample to plants who reported a change in foreign ownership less
than 10%, and then restricts the sample further to plants who reported lagged levels of foreign
ownership less than 10%-50% in columns 1-5 respectively. This restriction, by construction,
renders the first columns of tables 3.7 and 3.8 identical.
Table 3.7 is replicated in appendix C.2 with the ACF and Tornqvist productivity measures
as a robustness check.
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Table 3.7: Change in log TFP on change in foreign ownership. Sample is restricted to plants
with a level of lagged foreign ownership below 10%. Columns 1-5 correspond to restricting to
changes of foreign ownership less than 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%. Fixed effects by year,
region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering 1998-2001. Robust standard
errors clustered by plant in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
∆for<10% ∆for<20% ∆for<30% ∆for<40% ∆for<50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP
∆ foreign 3.794** -0.495 3.264** 2.429** 1.179
[1.706] [3.206] [1.348] [0.993] [0.770]
TFP−1 -0.496*** -0.496*** -0.497*** -0.497*** -0.497***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
size−1 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.145***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027]
Observations 8,763 8,768 8,776 8,779 8,793
R-squared 0.304 0.303 0.305 0.304 0.302
Table 3.8: Change in log TFP on change in foreign ownership. Sample is restricted to plants
with a change in foreign ownership below 10%. Columns 1-5 correspond to restricting to levels
of lagged foreign ownership less than 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%. Fixed effects by year,
region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering 1998-2001. Robust standard
errors clustered by plant in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
for−1 <10% for−1 <20% for−1 <30% forn−1 <40% for−1 <50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP
∆ foreign 3.794** 1.101 6.027* 0.370 0.159
[1.706] [1.626] [3.150] [1.557] [0.577]
TFP−1 -0.496*** -0.496*** -0.495*** -0.494*** -0.495***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019]
size−1 0.143*** 0.141*** 0.134*** 0.130*** 0.126***
[0.026] [0.025] [0.022] [0.020] [0.019]
Observations 8,763 8,782 8,801 8,823 8,877
R-squared 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.302 0.302
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Lagged changes in foreign ownership
In table 3.9 we report results for the regression specification
∆ai jrt =β0∆ f oreigni jr,t +β1∆ f oreigni jr,t−1+β2∆ f oreigni jr,t−2
+β3 sizei jr,t−1+β4 ai jr,t−1+α j +αr +αt−1+ εi jrt
(3.29)
both with and without the first term. With only data covering 4 years, this specification can only
be run for one year of the dependent variable.
Without the first term, estimates of β1 and β2 are not statistically significant, but point
estimates offer some suggestive confirmation that foreign ownership leads to improving log TFP
in future years.
Table 3.9: Change in log TFP on lags of changes in foreign ownership. Fixed effects by year,
region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering 1998-2001. Robust standard
errors clustered by plant in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2)
∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP
∆ foreign 0.269**
[0.135]
∆ foreign−1 0.358** 0.225
[0.180] [0.177]
∆ foreign−2 0.224 0.130
[0.224] [0.235]
TFP−1 -0.517*** -0.516***
[0.027] [0.027]
size−1 0.111*** 0.110***
[0.019] [0.019]
Observations 2,602 2,602
R-squared 0.379 0.378
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3.5.4 Instrumental variables
An endogeneity concern in the preceding results is that foreign investors have some
knowledge about which plants will see their productivity increase. This endogeneity would
not necessarily violate the efficient markets hypothesis because the future productivity increase
could already be priced into these firms’ equities. However the potential endogeneity alters the
interpretation of the estimates. Here we address this possible endogeneity.
The regressor, change in foreign ownership, is influenced by plant-specific factors and
therefore may be correlated with the error term. By employing a global instrument, we try to
isolate the causal factors apart from the plant-specific factors.
Productivity levels
We assume that foreign investors are more likely to invest in larger plants, and we use the
total real value of production for each plant from the preceding year as a preceding interaction
variable to make the instrument plant-specific. Foreign capital is more plentiful in some years,
and we can measure a relevant part of the global supply of capital with total outward portfolio
investment in equities from the US, UK, Euro area, and Japan. Lastly, we assume that some
industries are more appealing to foreign investors. So to instrument for changes in foreign
ownership, we interact total developed outflows with lagged plant size and with industry dummies.
The first stage estimating equation is
∆ f oreigni jrt = β jsizei jr,t−1out f lowst +β0 sizei jr,t−1+α j +αr +αt + εi jrt (3.30)
for a plant i, in industry j, at year t. This follows the empirical strategy of Keller and Yeaple
(2009). Interacting with industry dummies is equivalent to running the first stage industry by
industry, and pooling.
Instruments that assume shocks will be distributed according to some pre-existing shares
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originate with Bartik (1991.) They are the subject of several recent analyses (Borusyak, Hull, and
Jaravel 2018 and Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift 2018.) The key question is if the shares
are correlated with the error term, in which case the endogeneity problem remains. To address
this in our case, we add lagged size as a control in both stages of the instrumental variables (IV)
regression.
We run an IV regression with the second stage
ai jrt = β1 ˆ∆ f oreigni jrt ++βsizei jr,t−1+α j +αr +αt + εi jrt
and report results in table 3.10.
Table 3.10: Instrumental variables regression of log TFP level on change in foreign ownership.
Fixed effects by year, region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering 1998-2001.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1)
TFP LP
∆ foreign 0.908***
[0.347]
size−1 0.217***
[0.007]
Observations 9,547
First stage F stat 7.14
R-squared 0.578
Productivity changes
Here we aim to run second stage regressions identical to equation (3.21). Our first stage
takes the form
∆ f oreigni jrt = β jsizei jr,t−1out f lowst +β0 sizei jr,t−1+β1 ai jr,t−1+α j +αr +αt + εi jrt . (3.31)
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The results, in table 3.11, show statistical significance at the 5% level.
Table 3.11: Instrumental variables regression of change in log TFP on change in foreign
ownership. Fixed effects by year, region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE
covering 1998-2001. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1)
∆ TFP LP
∆ foreign 0.633**
[0.293]
TFP−1 -0.503***
[0.008]
size−1 0.112***
[0.006]
Observations 9,366
First stage F-stat 7.29
R-squared 0.304
Next we duplicate table 3.6, and restrict to levels of lagged foreign ownership less than
10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% in columns 1-5, respectively, of table 3.12.
3.5.5 Share of inputs imported
OLS in levels
In this section, we ask if foreign ownership changes how plants operate. One possibility
could be that foreign investors impart knowledge of foreign technology and links to foreign
suppliers. Our data includes imports of foreign inputs, so here we investigate if foreign owned
plants use more imported inputs.
Our dependent variable is what fraction of inputs are imported. The estimating equation is
imported input sharei jrt = β1 f oreigni jrt +α j +αr +αt + εi jrt . (3.32)
81
Table 3.12: Instrumental variables regression of change in log TFP on change in foreign
ownership. Columns 1-5 correspond to restricting to levels of lagged foreign ownership less
than 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%. Fixed effects by year, region, and 3-digit ISIC industry
code. Data from INE covering 1998-2001. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
for−1 <10% for−1 <20% for−1 <30% forn−1 <40% for−1 <50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP
∆ foreign 1.190*** 1.220*** 1.520*** 1.333*** 1.325***
[0.414] [0.409] [0.409] [0.383] [0.376]
TFP−1 -0.498*** -0.497*** -0.497*** -0.496*** -0.496***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
size−1 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.118***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Observations 8,834 8,855 8,877 8,902 8,957
First-stage F stat 3.62 3.59 3.88 4.18 4.3
R-squared 0.298 0.297 0.291 0.293 0.292
The results, in table 3.13, show that wholly domestic plants import less. Furthermore, it is the
presence of any foreign ownership, and not large levels, that implies a plant will import inputs.
This evidence that plants with low levels of foreign ownership employ economically
significantly more imported inputs suggests that portfolio investment may involve transfer of
information, management pratices, or technology to the recipient plants. This would have real
effects in the context of the model presented in chapter 2 or in Keller (2002) where technology
takes the form of differentiated intermediate inputs.
Instrumental Variables
We remploy the same instrument with a first stage as in equation (3.30). The estimating
equation takes the form
imported input sharei jrt = β ˆ∆ f oreigni jrt +β0 sizei jr,t−1+α j +αr +αt + εi jrt .
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Table 3.13: Regression of share of inputs imported on foreign ownership. Column 1 represents
the full sample. Columns 2-6 restrict the sample to plants with less than 10%-50% foreign
ownership respectively. Fixed effects by year, region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from
INE covering 1998-2001. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
for<10% for<20% for<30% for<40% for<50%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
imp share imp share imp share imp share imp share imp share
foreign 0.087*** 0.934 0.352*** 0.325*** 0.242*** 0.169***
[0.009] [0.888] [0.125] [0.064] [0.050] [0.037]
Obs 15,404 14,462 14,499 14,539 14,580 14,686
R2 0.154 0.123 0.124 0.126 0.128 0.128
We find that the IV estimate for the effect of the change on foreign ownership on the share of
inputs imported is significant at the 1% level.
Table 3.14: Instrumental variables regression of share of inputs imported on foreign ownership.
Fixed effects by year, region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering 1998-2001.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1)
import share
∆ foreign 0.163***
[0.053]
size−1 1.894***
[0.096]
Observations 10,144
First stage F-stat 6.29
R-squared 0.140
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3.6 Conclusion
In plant-level data from Chilean manufacturers, foreign ownership increases total factor
productivity. This effect is evident at low levels of foreign ownership. In other words, foreign
portfolio investment also has positive effects on productivity. One channel seems to be a shift of
the recipient of foreign capital towards the increased use of foreign intermediate goods.
Increases in foreign ownership coincide with increases in total factor productivity, and
this effect is maintained for small levels of foreign owmership and small increases in it. Previous
literature had focused on FDI, which requires a larger ownership stake. Our results suggest that it
is the initial, small foreign stake that matters most, as evidenced for example by the conditional
derivative of log TFP estimated to be decreasing in foreign ownership.
This matters because foreign portfolio investment flows have exploded in recent decades.
Our evidence that foreign ownership improves productivity implies increased transference of
international technology and management practices.
The policy implication of this result is that foreign portfolio investment is beneficial for
recipient plants. Therefore persistent FPI should be encouraged where possible.
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A.1 Illiquidity, robustness to maturity
Here we duplicate table 1.1 using 10 year maturities instead of 20 years. We argue that
the similarity of the results shows that illiquidity or stale prices do not drive the main conclusions.
Table A.1: Nominal exchange rate variance decomposition for Mexico. The long term is 10
years forward. Sample is April 2008 to July 2017.
var(qEt +θt) var(pt− p∗t + r∗t − rt) cov(qEt +θt , pt− p∗t + r∗t − rt)
levels 79.9 9.9 5.1
changes 154 70.3 -62.3
Table A.1 reports the variance decomposition in levels and monthly changes for Mexico.
Table A.2: Nominal exchange rate variance decomposition for Brazil. The long term is 10 years
forward. Sample is November 2005 to July 2017.
var(qEt +θt) var(pt− p∗t + r∗t − rt) cov(qEt +θt , pt− p∗t + r∗t − rt)
levels 63.3 32.3 2.19
changes 175 47.3 -61.0
Table A.2 reports the variance decomposition in levels and monthly changes for Brazil.
Table A.3: Nominal exchange rate variance decomposition for South Africa. The long term is
10 years forward. Sample is September 2011 to July 2017.
var(qEt +θt) var(pt− p∗t + r∗t − rt) cov(qEt +θt , pt− p∗t + r∗t − rt)
levels 35.8 20.6 21.8
changes 136 29.5 -32.6
Table A.3 reports the variance decomposition in levels and monthly changes for South
Africa.
A.2 A general approach to the stochastic discount factor
Here we outline a general approach to estimating the stochastic discount factor relying on
a few assumptions regarding distributions and functional forms.
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The observable state variables relevant for risk, utility, asset prices, and anything else
relevant are contained in a vector Xt+1 (n x 1). These variables are assumed to depend on their past
in some general way plus normally distributed innovations ut+1 (n x 1). So the data generating
process is
Xt+1 = F(Xt−s){s≥0}+ut+1, ut+1 ∼ N(0,Σ).
The function F(Xt−s){s≥0} may be a vector auto-regression of order p, or some nonlinear function
of the past variables. The typical case will be Xt+1 =ΦXt +ut+1, where Φ (n x n) is the VAR(1)
coefficient matrix.
Prices of risk take the “essentially-affine” form introduced by Duffee (2002)
λt
nx1
= λ0
nx1
+Λ1
nxn
Xt
nx1
.
Constant prices of risk, Λ1 = 0 will generate Fama-MacBeth regressions for pricing.
The stochastic discount factor, whose expectation must equal 1, takes the form
mt+1 = eλ
′
tut+1−1/2λ′tΣλt .
Finally, discounted, or excess returns for an asset with price at are defined as zt+1 =
at+1
atert
. Their
uncertainty is also assumed to captured by the factors and takes the form zt+1 = eδ
′
tXt+1 . δt (n x 1)
may be time-varying, but it is known at time t.
From these assumptions we use the fact that Et [mt+1zt+1] = 1 to get
1 = Et [eλ
′
tut+1−1/2λ′tΣλt+δ′t(F(Xt−s){s≥0}+ut+1)].
Evaluating the expectation and taking logs we have
δ′tΣλt =−δ′tF(Xt−s){s≥0}− 1/2δ′tΣδt .
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Left-multiplying both sides by Σ−1(δtδ′t)−1δt and taking the transpose solves for λt :
λ′t =−F(Xt−s)′{s≥0}Σ−1− 1/2δ′t .
Right-multiplying by Xt+1and rearranging yields
δ′tXt+1 =−2λ′tXt+1−2F(Xt−s)′{s≥0}Σ−1Xt+1.
The left-hand side of this are the excess returns. If we allow for return pricing errors εt+1 we can
write this as a linear regression
−F(Xt−s)′{s≥0}Σ−1Xt+1−
1
2
lnzt+1 = (λ0+Λ1Xt)′Xt+1+ εt+1.
The factors Xt and excess returns zt+1 are observable. The data-generating process F(Xt−s) can
be estimated. Therefore the price of risk factors λ0 and Λ1enter this equation as n and n× n
regression coefficients to be estimated by ordinary least squares.
Given the vector λ0 and matrix Λ1, combined with the factors Xt , the stochastic discount
factor mt+1 is estimated. This allows calculation of the relevant covariance in the risk premium
term.
88
Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 2
89
B.1 Robustness of extensive margin
In table B.1 we redo the first stylized fact using a 5% threshold for the new imports
margin.
Table B.1: Regression of extensive margin of imports on investment inflows and lag of the
dependent variable, using a 5% threshold. The final column means that an extra 1000 USD
of portfolio investment predicts 42.5 USD of extra imports of new varieties. All variables are
expressed as fractions of GDP. Data cover 2001 to 2015. Data from IMF, World Bank, and
Federal Reserve. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
new varieties imported
lagged portfolio eq inv 0.0981** 0.0977** 0.0984** 0.0492 0.0431 0.0425
(0.0321) (0.0307) (0.0306) (0.0335) (0.0322) (0.0321)
lagged direct eq invest 0.0158 0.0145 -0.0169 -0.0183
(0.0287) (0.0261) (0.0282) (0.0261)
lagged new imports -0.026 -0.112
(0.063) (0.061)
two lags of GDP growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects yes yes yes
R2 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.75
observations 233 247 248 233 247 248
In table B.2 we redo the first stylized fact, weighting countries by their GDP.
Both sets of regression demonstrate the robustness of the stylized fact.
B.2 Portfolio constraints
In this section we document evidence of portfolio constraints in portfolio investment
in equities. This fact is already well established in the literature on “contagion.” We examine
10 developing countries. Equity data comes from the Global Financial Database and portfolio
investment comes from the IMF Balance of Payments Database. 1 Data is quarterly for Q4 1997
1The countries examined are Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, South Africa,
Thailand, and Turkey. The respective equity indices are the Dow Jones Brazil, India S&P/Crisil-500, Dow Jones
Indonesia, ow Jones Malaysia, Dow Jones Mexico, Dow Jones Philippines, Russia MICEX Composite, Dow Jones
South Africa, Dow Jones Thailand, and Istanbul SE All-share.
90
Table B.2: Regression of extensive margin of imports on investment inflows and lag of the
dependent variable. The final column means that an extra 1000 USD of portfolio investment
predicts 103 USD of extra imports of new varieties. Countries are weighted by their GDP (or
equivalently, the elements of the regression are not normalized by GDP). Data cover 2001 to
2015. Data from IMF, World Bank, and Federal Reserve. Standard errors in brackets. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
new varieties imported
lagged portf eq inv 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.189*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.103***
(0.0322) (0.0309) (0.0306) (0.0320) (0.0309) (0.0306)
lagged direct eq inv -0.00663 0.00107 -0.0107 -0.00815
(0.0209) (0.0188) (0.0204) (0.0192)
lagged new imports 0.017 -0.010
(0.076) (0.076)
two lags GDP growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects yes yes yes
R2 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.70 0.70 0.70
observations 233 247 248 233 247 248
to Q3 2016.
Portfolio investment in equities is expressed as a fraction of GDP. Results are presented in
table B.4.
Portfolio flows are seen to be statistically persistent. The evidence for portfolio constraints
is that flows are positively correlated with lagged returns, at 5% significance. With a normal
downward sloping demand curve for assets, the sign would be negative. This suggests that
price falls cause sales, precisely the amplification mechanism in our model. Therefore portfolio
constraints are binding for the marginal investor, or at least they behave as if they are.
B.3 Firms’ use of external capital
Tradeables producers’ output is Y MEXT = A˜
1−α 1
α
(∫ NMEX
0 x
α(v)dv
)(
LMEXT
)1−α
.
Demand for intermediate inputs are xMEX = A˜LMEXT .
Wages are w = A˜1−αα N
MEX .
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Table B.3: Regression of portfolio equity investment on lagged equity returns. Data cover Q4
1997 to Q3 2016. Dynamic panel (Nickell 1981) bias is neglible because the time dimension is
much greater than the cross-sectional. Data from IMF and World Financial Database. Standard
errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
portfolio equity investment
lagged equity investment 0.23***
[0.036]
lagged equity returns 0.0028**
[0.0012]
lagged fed funds 0.00018
[0.00010]
lagged fed funds change 0.0011***
[0.00052]
lagged returns * abs(returns) -0.00022*
[0.00010]
country fixed effects yes
R2 0.095
observations 752
Tradeables producers’ intermediate input cost is X = xN = A˜LMEXT N.
Their wage cost is wLT = A˜1−αα N
MEX LT .
Their total cost is 1α A˜LT N.
So as varieties increase, intermediate input costs increase by α of total cost. If we assume
a standard capital share, α= 0.35, we would expect new financing of $1mm to lead to $350k of
imported varieties.
B.4 Dynamics of flows under leverage constraint
The foreign investor has financial capital Ks at the start of period s. Full leverage to a
factor Γmeans choosing to borrow (Γ−1)Ks in debt. These two together constitute the liability
side of the investor’s balance sheet. The assets are foreign equities, specifically a quantity Ns at a
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price Vs. Equality between assets and liabilities yields
ΓKs =VsNs. (B.1)
Profit earned between periods comes from equity price changes and interest costs:
pit+1 = (Vs+1−Vs)Ns− r(Γ−1)Ks. (B.2)
Financial capital changes with the profit, so
Ks+1 = Ks+pit+1. (B.3)
Subsequently, the investor chooses Ns+1 to meet the leverage constraint
ΓKs+1 =Vs+1Ns+1. (B.4)
Combining B.3 and B.4 we get
Vs+1Ns+1 = Γ(Ks+Vs+1Ns−VsNs− r(Γ−1)Ks). (B.5)
Using B.1 we can rewrite
Vs+1Ns+1 =VsNs+ΓVs+1Ns−ΓVsNs− r(Γ−1)VsNs). (B.6)
Rearranging produces
Ns+1−Ns
Ns
= (Γ−1)(Vs+1− (1+ r)Vs)
Vs+1
. (B.7)
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Defining portfolio flows ∆Ns+1 = Ns+1−Ns and excess price changes ∆Vs+1 = Vs+1−
(1+ r)Vs, we arrive at the key equation for portfolio flows’ response to price changes
∆Ns+1
Ns
= (Γ−1)∆Vs+1
Vs+1
. (B.8)
Clearly price volatility is much larger than interest costs, so the r term is negligible.
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C.1 Industry details
Table C.1: Industry classifications in ENIA dataset. Source: INE.
ISIC2 Frequency Description
311 4,297 Food manufacturing (a)
312 267 Food manufacturing (b)
313 320 Beverage industries
321 989 Manufacture of textiles
322 827 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear
323 121 Manufacture of leather and products of leather, leather substitutes and
324 402 Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanized or moulded rubber
331 1,134 Manufacture of wood and wood and cork products, except furniture
332 443 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal
341 298 Manufacture of paper and paper products
342 634 Printing, publishing and allied industries
351 241 Manufacture of industrial chemicals
352 598 Manufacture of other chemical products
354 60 Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal
355 195 Manufacture of rubber products
356 784 Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere classified
361 36 Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware
362 82 Manufacture of glass and glass products
369 517 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
371 125 Iron and steel basic industries
372 96 Non-ferrous metal basic industries
381 1,475 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery
382 674 Manufacture of machinery except electrical
383 215 Manufacture of electrical machinery apparatus, appliances and supplies
384 332 Manufacture of transport equipment
385 93 Manufacture of professional and scientific, and measuring and controlli
390 199 Other Manufacturing Industries
C.2 Robustness to productivity measure
Here we duplicate table 3.7 using the ACF and Tornqvist TFP measures.
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Table C.2: Change in log TFP on change in foreign ownership with ACF measure of TFP.
Sample is restricted to plants with a level of lagged foreign ownership below 10%. Columns 1-5
correspond to restricting to changes of foreign ownership less than 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and
50%. Fixed effects by year, region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering
1998-2001. Robust standard errors clustered by plant in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ TFP ACF ∆ TFP ACF ∆ TFP ACF ∆ TFP ACF ∆ TFP ACF
∆ foreign 3.025* 0.008 0.236 0.139 0.704
[1.797] [3.261] [1.218] [0.826] [0.769]
TFP−1 -0.503*** -0.503*** -0.503*** -0.503*** -0.503***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
size−1 0.027* 0.028* 0.028* 0.028* 0.030**
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Observations 8,763 8,768 8,776 8,779 8,793
R-squared 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.271
Table C.3: Change in log TFP on change in foreign ownership with Tornqvist measure of TFP.
Sample is restricted to plants with a level of lagged foreign ownership below 10%. Columns 1-5
correspond to restricting to changes of foreign ownership less than 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and
50%. Fixed effects by year, region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering
1998-2001. Robust standard errors clustered by plant in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ TFP TQV ∆ TFP TQV ∆ TFP TQV ∆ TFP TQV ∆ TFP TQV
∆ foreign 1.277 1.633** 1.582* 0.231 -0.077
[1.225] [0.720] [0.826] [0.597] [0.404]
TFP−1 -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
size−1 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.020
[0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Observations 6,400 6,403 6,406 6,409 6,420
R-squared 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.238
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C.3 Robustness to outliers
Our data may contain plants that face extreme shocks such as labor disputes or fires, for
example. Our analysis would measure close to zero TFP in some cases. Here we exlude TFP
outliers to show that our results are not driven by outliers.
Here we duplicate table 3.7, first removing all observations where the dependent variable
is more than 4 standard deviations from the mean.
Table C.4: Change in log TFP on change in foreign ownership with Tornqvist measure of TFP.
Sample is restricted to plants with a level of lagged foreign ownership below 10%. Columns 1-5
correspond to restricting to changes of foreign ownership less than 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and
50%. Fixed effects by year, region, and 3-digit ISIC industry code. Data from INE covering
1998-2001. Robust standard errors clustered by plant in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP ∆ TFP LP
∆ foreign 3.733** -0.695 2.559* 1.867** 0.053
[1.560] [3.128] [1.333] [0.929] [0.348]
TFP−1 -0.406*** -0.405*** -0.406*** -0.406*** -0.406***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
size−1 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.119***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028]
Observations 8,686 8,691 8,698 8,701 8,713
R-squared 0.237 0.236 0.237 0.236 0.236
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